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Comment
Spoliation of Evidence and
Medical Malpractice
I. Introduction
Spoliation of evidence has been defined as "the intentional
destruction of evidence . . . ."I However, spoliation has devel-
oped into a more expansive concept, and may be accomplished
by destruction, alteration, tampering or concealment of physical
evidence, and tampering with witnesses. 2 It is a major vexation
to the execution of justice since it hinders the pursuit of the
truth.3 Spoliation has been looked upon unfavorably and has
been the subject of a variety of remedies.4
The 1982 film "The Verdict" centered around a medical
malpractice trial.5 A young woman aspirated gastric contents
during the induction of general anesthesia, leaving her in a veg-
etative state.6 The most dramatic piece of evidence was the tes-
timony of a former admitting nurse, who stated that the
anesthesiologist had ordered her to alter the admission history
to reflect that the patient's last meal had been consumed nine
hours, rather than one hour, before admission. 7 This was done
to disguise the negligent administration of anesthesia to a pa-
1. BLACiK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990). Destruction, in turn, has
been defined as "rendering discoverable matter permanently unavailable to the
court and the opposing party." JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVI-
DENCE § 1.1 (1989).
2. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
3. GORELICK, supra note 1, § 1.11.
4. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
5. THE VERDICT (Twentieth Century Fox 1982).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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1
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:235
tient with a full stomach.8 Although the jury was instructed to
disregard this testimony,9 the damage had been done. Not only
did the jury return a verdict for the plaintiff, but it inquired of
the dumbfounded judge whether damages were limited by
plaintiffs prayer for relief.'0
In the real life medical malpractice context, spoliation of ev-
idence continues to be, or at least is alleged to be, an all too
frequent occurrence." It may be accomplished by altering the
medical record, 12 adding to the record at some time after an ini-
tial entry, 13 deleting or substituting, 14 obliterating, 5 substitut-
ing a fabricated record, 16 and by destruction or loss of
radiographs, laboratory reports, or physical evidence.' 7 It has
been estimated that as many fifty percent of medical malprac-
tice cases involve altered records,' 8 and that ten percent of all
8. Id.
9. The copy of the admissions form violated the cinematic version of the best
evidence rule.
10. Id.; see E.R. Shipp, Message of 'The Verdict' Debated in Courthouse, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1983, at B1.
11. Robert L. Prosser, Alteration of Medical Records Submitted for Medicole-
gal Review, 267 JAMA 2630 (1992); e.g., generally Bruce Maston, The Record of
Malpractice Is Undeniable - and Frightening, TImEs UNION (Albany), Sept. 14,
1992, at A6; Terry Neal, Plantation Doctor to Pay $1 Million Dollars in Boy's
Death, MLAmi HERALD, Mar. 31, 1992, at 3BR (request for punitive damages per-
mitted based upon allegations of altering medical record and destruction of origi-
nals); Thomas Omestad, 4 Infants Die - Doctor and Aide Charged with Murder,
L.A_ TImEs, Nov. 4, 1986, § Metro at 6 (disposal of body of stillborn in unknown
manner and destruction of records); Robin Topping, Victim's Lawyer: Probe
NCMC, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 16, 1988, § News at 21 (overwritten order, morphine
overdose).
12. Anonymous, Altered Medication Orders in Medical Records, 22 Hosp.
PHARMAcY 230 (1987). "Altered medical records are records on which changes have
been made to the original record's entry after its completion, without following an
established protocol for record correction." Id. at 230.
13. John Barchilon, The Case of the Doctored Record, TRIAL, Oct. 1978, at 27,
30.
14. Harold L. Hirsh, Tampering with Medical Records, 24 MED. TRIAL TECH.
Q. 450, 454 (1978).
15. Sanford M. Gage, Alteration, Falsification, and Fabrication of Records in
Medical Malpractice Actions, 27 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 476 (1981).
16. Id. at 478-79.
17. Id. at 480.
18. Robert C. Mathews, Altering the Medical Record, 10 Am. J. EMERG. MED.
162, 162 (1992).
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malpractice cases involve fraudulently altered records.19 Such
alteration may be prompted by the emotional turmoil triggered
by a malpractice suit.20 Records may also be routinely altered
regardless of whether concern exists about a malpractice suit.21
The value of unaltered records in defending a malpractice ac-
tion has been acknowledged. 22 Despite warnings to health care
personnel that such attempts are viewed as self-serving 23 and
are susceptible to detection by document examiners, attempts
to alter medical records continue.24 The physician who alters
medical records, after becoming aware of the possibility of mal-
practice litigation, may be subject to cancellation of professional
liability insurance. 25 Even excellent medical care may prove in-
defensible in a malpractice suit if records have been altered.26
19. Richard F. Gibbs, The Present and Future Medicolegal Importance of Rec-
ord Keeping in Anesthesia and Intensive Care: The Case for Automation, 5 J.
CLINICAL MONITORING 251, 253 (1989).
20. Mathews, supra note 18, at 162.
21. D. C. Galletly et al., The Anaesthetic Record: A Confidential Survey on
Data Omission or Modification, 19 ANAESTHESIA AND INTENSIVE CARE 74 (1991).
Occasional data omission or falsification occurred according to 55% of New Zealand
anesthesiologists surveyed. Id.
22. Mirkin v. Medical Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc'y, 572 A.2d 1126 (Md. Ct. Sp. App.
1990). The court wrote:
[ciredible, accurate, contemporaneous medical records are the foundation of
the proper defense of a medical malpractice claim. Even if contemporaneous
records are not complete, credible testimony of a treating physician may be
used to supplement the records and demonstrate compliance with the appli-
cable standard of care. If a physician submits subsequently prepared medi-
cal records which are represented as contemporaneous, however, the
credibility of the contemporaneous records as well as of the physician will be
destroyed.
Id. at 1131.
23. Gibbs, supra note 19, at 252.
24. Karen A. Dean, Altering the Patient Record, Focus ON CRITICAL CARE,
Apr., 1984, at 48. Document examination experts may search for overwriting, era-
sures, use of ink eradicator or other chemicals, intactness of paper coating, differ-
ences in ink color and composition, writing surface, slant, angle, and instrument.
Id. at 49-50. Microscopic examination and ultraviolet light may be employed to
detect alteration of documents. Id. at 50.
25. Mirkin, 572 A.2d at 1131-32 (holding that cancellation of physician's pro-
fessional liability insurance for improper alteration of medical records was reason-
ably related to insurer's economic and business purposes).
26. Prosser, supra note 11, at 2631.
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Less ominous is the negligent loss of medical records by a disor-
ganized medical records department. 27
Spoliation, however, is not the sole province of the defend-
ant. Less commonly, spoliation of evidence will be the act of the
plaintiff patient, not the defendant health care provider.28
This Comment will examine spoliation of evidence in the
context of medical malpractice actions. Part II will discuss the
background of spoliation of evidence and policy reasons for con-
trolling spoliation. Section A will discuss the definition of spoli-
ation. Section B will discuss the various remedies for
spoliation: the spoliation inference, discovery sanctions, and the
independent tort of spoliation. Section B will also discuss the
applicability of obstruction of justice statutes and record reten-
tion statutes. Section C will discuss the law of bailments and
its analogy to the duty to preserve evidence. Part III will re-
view case law relating to spoliation of evidence in the medical
malpractice arena, and is divided into sections containing
groups of cases representing each of the spoliation remedies.
Part IV will analyze the availability and effectiveness of the
various remedies for spoliation and the analogy between the
law governing preservation of evidence and the law of bail-
ments. Part V, in conclusion, proposes that in the medical mal-
practice context, while no single remedy will always provide
adequate relief, a bailments approach may provide the simplest,
most uniform remedy to spoliation in the medical malpractice
context.
27. Frederick L. Brancati, Readers of the Lost Chart: An Archaeologic Ap-
proach to the Medical Record, 267 JAMA 1860 (1992). The author whimsically de-
scribes the medical records department as:.
the Temple of Doom .... [gluarded by file clerks, who in Greek mythology
were described as having the body of a serpent and the head of John
Sununu, the eye perceives the gory silhouettes of unsorted charts strewn
haphazardly across long tables in dim light. To find the grail, the only op-
tion is to examine the grisly remains of each chart one-by-one while suffo-
cating in the heavy odor of bureaucracy.
Id. at 1861.
28. E.g., Jerome v. Pardis, 783 P.2d 919 (Mont. 1989) (noting that after de-
fendant's discovery request plaintiff withheld a letter from a subsequent treating
physician and her own written statement concerning her long history of back
ailments).
238 [Vol. 14:235
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II. Background
A. Definition of Spoliation
At its simplest, spoliation of evidence may be defined as the
destruction of evidence.29 Although there appears to be no uni-
versally accepted definition, "destruction" may be defined as
"rendering evidence permanently unavailable to the court and
the opposing party."30 This may involve actual physical de-
struction (shredding), alteration (such as creation of a paper
copy of records or erasure of electronically stored computer
files), concealment or relocation of evidence to a permanently
inaccessible location. 31 It also encompasses attempts to prevent
or alter the testimony of witnesses by intimidation or coercion.32
In the context of spoliation, "evidence" refers not only to proof
admissible at trial, but also to other discoverable proof.33
B. Remedies for Spoliation
Historically, the courts have fashioned a number of reme-
dies for those injured by spoliation. 34 The spoliation inference is
a time-honored remedy.35 Discovery sanctions have also been
employed.36 More recently, several jurisdictions have approved,
or at least considered, the independent tort of spoliation of
evidence. 37
Generally, three policy reasons exist justifying the control
of spoliation of evidence: promotion of truth-seeking, fairness,
and preservation of the integrity of the judicial system.3 8 There
are three corresponding purposes for remedial measures in re-
sponse to spoliation: restoration of accuracy, compensation of
29. BLACes LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990).
30. GORELICK, supra note 1, § 1.1.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 1.4.
33. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(1). The rule provides for discovery of "any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion," even though "the information sought need not be admissible at the trial"
provided that "the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence." Id.
34. GoREmcK, supra note 1, § 1.2.
35. Id. § 1.3.
36. Id. § 1.5.
37. See infra notes 87-114 and accompanying text.
38. GORELICK, supra note 1, §§ 1.9-.13.
1994] 239
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the victim of spoliation, and punishment of the spoliator.39 In
turn, the aim of punishment may be retribution against the spo-
liator or deterrence of spoliative conduct. 40 The purpose of res-
toration of accuracy is closely tied to the policy of promoting
truth-seeking;41 the compensation purpose parallels the fair-
ness policy; and the punitive aspect may prevent further incur-
sions upon judicial integrity.42 The effectiveness of the various
remedial measures for spoliation in the medical malpractice
context will be examined with these aims in mind.
1. Spoliation Inference
The existence of negative consequences to one who destroys
evidence is summarized by the maxim, "omnia praesumuntur
contra spoliatorem," that is, "[a]ll things are presumed against a
despoiler or wrongdoer."43 However, the terms "inference" and
"presumption" have been used interchangeably and indiscrimi-
nately.44 The spoliation inference permits, but does not require,
the trier of fact to find that the evidence not produced was
harmful to the spoliator.45 A presumption of spoliation, on the
other hand, compels the trier of fact to find that the missing
evidence was harmful to the spoliator unless the presumption is
rebutted by the spoliator, thus shifting the burden of production
to the spoliator.46 Generally, courts have invoked an inference
rather than a true presumption.47 According to Judge Learned
Hand, such an inference arises because "[w]hen a party is once
found to be fabricating, or suppressing, documents, the natural,
indeed the inevitable, conclusion is that he has something to
39. Id. §§ 1.9, 1.21.
40. Id. § 1.21.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 1086 (6th ed. 1990); see GOREMLICK, supra note 1,
§ 1.3 (citing Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722) (instructing the
jury to make the strongest presumption against a jeweler who refused to produce a
gemstone brought to him for appraisal by a chimney sweep)).
44. See generally GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF Evi-
DENCE, § 3.2 (2d ed. 1987) (distinguishing between presumptions and inferences).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 29 AM. Jun. 2D Evidence § 177 (1967). "It is a general rule that the inten-
tional spoliation or destruction of evidence relevant to a case raises a presumption,
or, more properly, an inference, that the evidence would have been unfavorable to
the cause of the spoliator." Id.
240 [Vol. 14:235
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conceal, and is conscious of guilt."48 In other words, he who has
spoliated evidence is presumed to have a weak case at the
outset.
Whether intentional spoliation is always indicative of con-
sciousness of guilt or of the weakness of one's case, however, has
been questioned. 49 For example, an innocent party may wish to
avoid the inconvenience or notoriety of litigation, or may feel
that his honestly held belief in his own innocence may give him
the "right" to destroy evidence.50 However, even the spoliator
who destroys evidence due to a firm belief in his own innocence
deprives the opposing party and the finder of fact of the oppor-
tunity to weigh all available relevant evidence.51
Traditionally, in order to apply the inference of spoliation,
five elements must be shown: (1) destruction; (2) the destroyed
matter must be relevant to the dispute; (3) the destruction must
be intentional; (4) the evidence must be destroyed at a time
when legal proceedings are pending or reasonably foreseeable;
and (5) the destruction must be carried out by a party or its
agent.52 The inference against the spoliator serves three main
functions: (1) accurate fact finding; (2) compensation of the
party placed at a disadvantage by the act of spoliation; and (3)
punishment of the spoliator.53
The element of intent has been subject to varying interpre-
tations.54 The breadth of the inference against the spoliator has
varied depending upon whether the destruction has been
48. Warner Barnes & Co. v. Kokosai Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 102 F.2d 450,
453 (2d Cir.), modified per curiam, 103 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1939).
49. GORELICK, supra note 1, § 2.3.
50. Id.
51. John M. Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spolia-
tion, 45 YALE L.J. 226 (1935). The authors wrote:
[c]ourtroom truth is what a jury or the judge finds after full and fair presen-
tation of evidence. The correct hostile inference from efforts to prevent a
witness from giving testimony is that the offending party, by disclosing un-
willingness to let the tribunal use human recollection and all other materi-
als relevant to the shaping of courtroom truth, gives support to the
conclusion that a proper finding would be against him.
Id. at 238.
52. GoREucK, supra note 1, § 2.5.
53. Id. § 1.21.
54. Id. § 2.8; see also 29 AM. Jun. 2D Evidence § 177 (1967). "Such a presump-
tion or inference arises, however, only where the spoliation or destruction was in-
tentional, and indicated fraud and a desire to suppress the truth, and it does not
19941 241
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"merely" intentional (a deliberate destruction of information
without the intent of depriving the court of information), or
"truly" intentional or purposeful (a deliberate destruction with
the intent to deprive the court of information).55 If merely in-
tentional, the destruction would permit the finder of fact to in-
fer that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to the
spoliator, while if truly intentional, a general inference of con-
sciousness of guilt could be raised.56 In either case, the spolia-
tion inference will neither restore accuracy nor compensate the
victim in the case of negligent spoliation. 57
Destruction of material that is normally destroyed in the
course of business may not be actionable if litigation was not
foreseeable. 58 Destruction of evidence before the commence-
ment of a suit or before the reasonable expectation that a suit
will commence will not generally give rise to the inference of
spoliation.59 Thus, destruction of evidence in the course of a
routine records destruction program, before litigation is foresee-
able, will not give rise to a spoliation inference, even if such evi-
dence were later found to be relevant. 60 In the medical
malpractice context, this requirement seldom presents a practi-
cal problem, since the statutorily required period for record re-
tention usually exceeds the limitation period for bringing a
malpractice action.61 However, when the discovery rule is ap-
plied to extend the statute of limitations many years beyond the
actual onset of harm, records may become less accessible or may
arise where the destruction was a matter of routine with no fraudulent intent." Id.
(footnote omitted).
55. Miller v. Montgomery County, 494 A.2d 761, 768 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985).
56. Id.
57. GORELICK, supra note 1, § 2.8 (noting the intent requirement to raise the
spoliation inference); but see Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1988);
Sullivan v. General Motors Corp., 772 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Ohio, E.D. 1991) (spolia-
tion of evidence charge would not be given where failure to take photographs was
neither negligent nor in bad faith); Battocchi v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 581 A.2d
759 (D.C. 1990); DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818 (Miss.
1992).
58. GORELICK, supra note 1, §§ 8.1-.8.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. E.g., Virginia requires retention of medical records for ten years, VA. CODE
ANN. § 42.1-79.1 (Michie 1990), but has a two year statute of limitations on medi-
cal malpractice. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243 (Michie 1992).
242 [Vol. 14:235
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even have been destroyed.62 Under such circumstances, the re-
quirement that litigation be pending or foreseeable does not
necessarily serve the accuracy, compensatory, or punitive pur-
poses of the spoliation inference. 63
The spoliation inference will apply only where the spoliator
is a party or its agent. 4 Application of the inference cannot ef-
fectively punish a non-party spoliator; other remedies, however,
may be involved. 65
2. Discovery Sanctions
Sanctions for spoliation of evidence are based upon: (1)
broad discovery sanctions predicated upon a court order;66 (2)
the court's inherent power absent a specific order;67 (3) rules re-
quiring a party to serve a written response for requests for in-
spection and discovery;68 (4) the due process clauses of the
United States Constitution;69 (5) rules concerning a party's obli-
gation to make reasonable inquiry before filing pleadings; 70 and
(6) rules regarding a party's obligation to make reasonable in-
quiry before making discovery responses.71
Discovery sanctions may be monetary or nonmonetary. 72
Monetary sanctions include compensating the injured party for
discovery costs, the cost of reconstructing evidence, and attor-
ney's fees.73 Nonmonetary sanctions include precluding evi-
62. See infra notes 450-51 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
64. GoRELiCK, supra note 1, § 2.10.
65. See infra notes 107-09, 113-14, 153-60 and accompanying text.
66. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b).
67. Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 126-27 (S.D. Fla.
1987); Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 548-49 (W.D. Okla. 1979); see infra notes
296-99 and accompanying text.
68. FED. R. Cirv. P. 37(d).
69. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1; Barker, 85 F.R.D. at 547-49 (stating
that "the requirement of due process is not an ephemeral concept, confined to the
criminal area, but extends to all litigants the standard of fundamental fairness in
federal court").
70. FED. R. Clv. P. 11; National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115
F.R.D. 543, 554 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
71. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(g); National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 115 F.R.D. at
554.
72. GORELICK, supra note 1, § 3.14.
73. Id. § 3.16.
19941 243
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dence,74 deeming certain facts established,75 dismissing the
action, 76 entering a default judgment,77 and holding the offend-
ing party in contempt.78
The elements required to establish grounds for the applica-
tion of discovery sanctions have been listed as: (1) destruction
(2) of discoverable matter (3) which the spoliator knew or
should have known (4) was relevant to pending, imminent, or
reasonably foreseeable litigation. 79 These elements are similar
to those required for the spoliation inference, but here the mea-
sure of culpability also may be negligence, not only intent.80
Although it is not specifically required that the destruction be
carried out by a party or its agent, discovery sanctions are not
generally sought against non-party spoliators.8 1
The severity of sanctions that courts will fashion are gener-
ally conditioned upon two factors: (1) the degree of the spolia-
tor's culpability, and (2) the degree of prejudice to the spoliation
victim.8 2 Sanctions may be imposed even for inadvertent spolia-
tion if the victim is severely prejudiced;8 3 conversely, no or mild
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(bX2)(B); Nally v. Volkswagen of America Inc., 539
N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1989) (precluding evidence where plaintiffs accident recon-
struction expert destroyed allegedly defective parts during testing, leaving defend-
ant with no direct evidence to present to jury).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
77. Id.
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D).
79. GORELICK, supra note 1, § 3.1.
80. Huber v. Henley, 669 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D. Ind. 1987). In Huber, defend-
ants inadvertently placed the axle and suspension of a truck trailer involved in a
motor vehicle accident case in another vehicle in violation of a court order to pre-
serve evidence. Id. at 1476. The court noted:
The discovery provisions of the federal rules require more, however, than
the absence of intentional noncompliance; they impose an affirmative duty
upon counsel and litigants to ensure compliance. The failure of compliance
in this case was the direct result of negligence in the communication of in-
structions from counsel to the litigant's employees.
Id. at 1477.
81. See, e.g., Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 415 (9th Cir.
1978).
82. GoREucK, supra note 1, § 3.14.
83. DePuy, Inc. v. Eckes, 427 So. 2d 306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
244
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss1/6
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
sanctions may be imposed for intentional misconduct resulting
in no prejudice to the opposing party. 84
As with the spoliation inference, discovery sanctions are
available in all jurisdictions, but unlike the inference, the com-
pensation purpose of remedying an act of spoliation is better
served by the relaxed culpability requirements associated with
discovery sanctions.8 5 However, the punitive purpose of reme-
dying spoliation may be less well served, since even intentional
acts of spoliation may receive light sanctions if no actual preju-
dice to the opponent resulted.86 As with the inference, third
party spoliators are not covered.
3. The Tort of Spoliation8 7
Several jurisdictions have recognized an independent tort
of spoliation of evidence.88 The case credited with establishing
the modern tort of spoliation of evidence is Smith v. Superior
Court. 9 In Smith, a tire flew off a van and crashed through the
windshield of plaintiffs vehicle, causing plaintiff permanent bi-
lateral blindness and impairment of sense of smell.90 The
dealer who had installed the customized wheels agreed to a re-
quest by plaintiffs counsel to preserve certain car parts, includ-
ing the wheels, but later lost, destroyed, or otherwise disposed
of them, making it impossible for plaintiffs expert to determine
the cause of the failure of the wheel assembly.91 A cause of ac-
tion for intentional spoliation of evidence was allowed on the
ground that plaintiff relied, to his detriment, on defendant's
promise by foregoing to seek a restraining order compelling
84. See Thurman-Bryant Elec. Supply Co. v. UNISYS Corp., Inc., No. 03A01-
CV00152, 1991 WL 222256 at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1991) (concluding that
summary judgment was an inappropriate sanction for plaintiffs unintentional de-
struction of computer where no prejudice to defendant resulted).
85. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
86. See infra note 470 and accompanying text.
87. See generally Nancy Melgaard, Note, Spoliation of Evidence-An
Independent Tort?, 67 N.D. L. REv. 501 (1991).
88. Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska, 1986); Smith v.
Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d
1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); see infra notes 336-56 and accompanying text.
89. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984).
90. Id. at 831.
91. Id.
1994] 245
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maintenance of evidence. 92 The novelty of the tort was not a bar
to recognition.93 Further, the court found that a previous Cali-
fornia decision may have recognized a negligence cause of ac-
tion for spoliation of evidence. 94 The court distinguished Smith
from a case in which damages were sought for conspiracy to ob-
struct the orderly prosecution of a civil action.95 It was further
noted that the concern of criminal prosecution is vindication of
public interests, not compensation of the injured plaintiff.96
The court further noted that criminal prosecution would not act
as a sufficient deterrent since the penalty was only a misde-
meanor, and since the statute had never been used to prosecute
destruction of evidence in a civil case.97 The uncertainty of the
existence and amount of damages also was not viewed as an
obstacle.98 The tort of intentional spoliation of evidence was
analogized to intentional interference with prospective business
92. Id. at 832.
93. Id. Quoting Prosser, the court stated that:
[niew and nameless torts are being recognized constantly .... The law of
torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development are never set.
When it becomes clear that the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protec-
tion against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is
novel will not of itself operate as a bar to a remedy.
Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEE-rON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 1 at 3-4 (4th ed. 1971)) (emphasis in original).
94. Id. at 833 (citing Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983) (implying
that a cause of action for failure to preserve evidence could be stated if a duty to
preserve evidence was demonstrated)).
95. Id. at 833-34 (citing Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)).
In Agnew the plaintiff, who had already been successful in the underlying mal-
practice action, brought a civil conspiracy action against a county medical society
for allegedly conspiring to intimidate witnesses, to recommend a biased expert wit-
ness, and to conceal X-rays. Agnew, 343 P.2d at 121-29. The court held that the
allegation of perjury could have been raised at the prior proceeding, and was thus
merged with the previous action, and that there was no private cause of action for
pejury. Id. at 124. In Smith there was no merger problem since the plaintiff had
not yet gone to trial. Id. at 833-34.
96. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
97. Id. at 835.
98. Id. at 835-36. The court stated that:
[wihere the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of
the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of... justice
to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer
from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may
not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the
evidence show[s] the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reason-
able inference, although the result be only approximate.
246
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advantage.99 Thus, by analogy, the prospective civil action giv-
ing rise to the tort of spoliation has been stated to be a valuable
probable expectancy of the party, harm to which is directly
actionable. 10o
Other jurisdictions have considered whether spoliation
should be recognized as an independent tort without ultimately
ruling on the issue. 10' Kansas appears to have rejected the tort,
reasoning that it simply amounts to a tort remedy for perjury.10 2
Id. at 835 (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson P. Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,
563 (1931) (antitrust action seeking damages for alleged conspiracy)).
The court noted that approximated damages for future earnings were rou-
tinely awarded for causes of action for wrongful death, personal injury, defama-
tion, invasion of privacy, and patent and trademark infringement. Id. at 836.
99. Id. at 836.
100. See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 464 (Alaska
1986).
101. E.g., La Raia v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 286 (Ariz. 1986) (holding that
where destruction of physical evidence in an underlying negligence action caused
physical harm, the spoliation provided the basis for a traditional negligence claim);
Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding
that plaintiff's injury from spoliation was not speculative since he had lost the
underlying suit, but the tort of spoliation would not lie since the spoliation was not
the proximate cause of the injury); Fox v. Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (holding that an action for spoliation of evidence was premature, since no
final judgment had been rendered in the underlying action, and damages would be
speculative); Miller v. Montgomery County, 494 A.2d 761 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)
(holding that relief under the spoliation tort would not be available when the vic-
tim of spoliation could be afforded full relief under the spoliation inference, but
admitted the spoliation tort could provide relief against a non-party spoliator);
Pharr v. Cortese, 147 Misc. 2d 1078, 559 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990)
(holding that the alleged alteration of medical records would not allow plaintiff to
amend complaint to include spoliation of evidence, not yet recognized in New York,
since the alleged spoliation had not made her case more difficult to prosecute, and
since the spoliation inference and criminal prosecution for altering medical records
were available remedies); Tomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E. 2d 944
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (finding no evidence that plaintiffs products liability claim
was unsuccessful because of the destroyed evidence, or that destroyed evidence
would have allowed her to successfully pursue it); Studier v. Taliak, 599 N.E.2d
718 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the trial court's holding that Ohio did not
recognize a cause of action for spoliation of evidence was moot, since plaintiffs
pleading was defective for failing to state actual damages).
102. Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987) (hold-
ing that where there is no duty to preserve evidence, no cause of action could be
brought against a non-party spoliator; also, tort of spoliation of evidence would
create an impermissible private remedy for perjury); see also Agnew v. Parks, 343
P.2d 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that there was no private cause of action for
perjury); but see ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 870 (West 1964) (creating a private
cause of action for perjury).
13
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However, this reasoning was rejected in North Carolina. 10 3
Georgia has rejected the tort outright. 04 In Spano v. McAvoy 0 5
the Northern District of New York apparently rejected the tort,
but the precedential effect of that decision is unclear. 10 6
The tort of spoliation of evidence may be either intentional
or negligent. The elements of intentional spoliation are: (1)
probability of litigation involving the plaintiff; (2) knowledge by
defendant of litigation or probability of litigation; (3) intentional
spoliation designed to adversely affect the plaintiff; (4) actual
disruption of plaintiffs cause of action; and (5) damages result-
ing from spoliation. 10 7 These elements are analogous to those
for intentional interference with prospective economic advan-
tage. 08 The elements do not appear to bar a cause of action
against a non-party spoliator. 0 9
The elements of negligent spoliation of evidence are: (1) the
degree to which the transaction was meant to affect the plain-
tiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff was actually harmed; (4) the de-
gree of certainty that the plaintiffs injury was the result of the
defendant's action; (5) the moral blame associated with defend-
103. Henry v. Deen, 310 S.E.2d 326, 334 (N.C. 1984) (distinguishing a claim
for civil conspiracy leading to injury of a cause of action from claims seeking dam-
ages for the loss of a claim from parties alleged to have committed perjury or sub-
ornation of perjury).
104. Gardner v. Blackston, 365 S.E.2d 545, 546 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). The court
noted: "Neither does Georgia law recognize spoliation of evidence as a separate
tort, nor is there any indication here that the evidence was despoiled or tampered
with." Id.
105. 589 F. Supp. 423 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
106. The court in Spano appears to have construed Smith v. Superior Court to
have limited the spoliation tort to cases where a prior agreement between the par-
ties to preserve evidence existed. However, Smith analogized the tort of spoliation
of evidence to the tort of intentional interference with prospective business advan-
tage, which does not require a prior agreement. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
107. County of Solano v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 729 (Ct. App. 1989).
108. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 872 (Cal. 1975) (listing elements of
the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage as: (1) an
economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third person containing the
probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) knowledge by the defend-
ant of the existence of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the de-
fendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) disruption of the relationship; and
(5) damages proximately caused by the acts of the defendant).
109. See Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Kan.
1987) (holding that a non-party spoliator had no duty to preserve evidence absent
a special relationship).
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ant's action; and (6) the desire to prevent future harm."0 These
elements center around whether a duty to preserve evidence ex-
ists on the part of the defendant in the absence of specific no-
tice."' The critical element is the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff; the presence of a duty is a question of law.1 2 Unlike
intentional spoliation, the elements of negligent spoliation ap-
pear to preclude a cause of action against the non-party spolia-
tor. 1 3 However, one court has analogized the negligent
destruction of evidence by a non-party to the loss or destruction
of goods by a bailee.114
4. Obstruction of Justice Statutes
Federal and many state jurisdictions have general obstruc-
tion of justice statutes or statutes which do not specifically men-
tion destruction of evidence.1' 5 Other states have statutes that
specifically prohibit destruction of evidence" 6 and provide crim-
inal penalties for destroying, altering, concealing, mutilating,
removing or tampering with physical evidence if the spoliator
knows or believes that an official proceeding has begun or is
likely to be instituted, and if the destruction is done with the
110. Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504, 506
(Ct. App. 1985).
111. Solano, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
114. Tomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 944 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that while destruction of automobile by plaintiff's insurer's agent may
have given rise to a cause of action in contract or tort for bailee's failure to return
bailor's goods, plaintiff was not seeking the market value of the bailed goods, but
rather consequential damages for the loss of a prospective civil action).
115. E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993); MD. ANN. CODE of
1957, art. 27, § 27 (1992 & Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-9-55 (1972 & Supp.
1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-32-3 (1981 & Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3015
(Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-5-27 (1992).
116. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-129 (1982 & Supp. 1993); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2809 (1989); AR& CODE ANN. § 5-53-111 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-8-610 (1986 & Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-155 (West 1985);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-723 (1981 & Supp. 1993); HAw. REV. STAT. § 710-1076 (1985);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.100 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 455 (West 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-207 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-922 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 641:6 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-09-
03 (1985 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 215.40 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.12 (Anderson 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 162.295 (1991);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-
510 (1990 & Supp. 1993); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.72.150 (West 1988).
15
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intent to impair the verity or availability of the evidence. 17 In
some jurisdictions, obstruction of justice statutes apply only to
criminal proceedings,"18 and thus would afford no remedy in a
medical malpractice action. Federal' 19 and state120 witness
tampering statutes also exist. Obstruction statutes provide ad-
ditional weapons against intentional spoliation of evidence, but
are rarely invoked against spoliation in civil matters.1 2' Be-
cause of infrequent prosecution and the possibility of relatively
minor penalties, obstruction of justice statutes are regarded as
insufficient to deter such action by a party who stands to gain
considerable financial benefit through the absence of critical
evidence. 122
5. Record Retention Statutes
Medical records are maintained for numerous purposes.
The primary purpose is to provide information regarding the
patient's diagnosis, condition, response to treatment, and prog-
nosis, not only for the use of the current health care providers,
but also for future providers. 23 Secondary purposes include
billing, utilization review, quality assurance review, risk man-
117. The offense is a felony in Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York,
Ohio, Texas, and Utah. It is a misdemeanor in Alabama, Hawaii, Oregon, and
Washington. In Arkansas and North Dakota the offense is a felony if spoliation
occurs in the context of a felony proceeding and a misdemeanor for other proceed-
ings. See supra note 116.
118. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.13 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 31-4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 719.3(1) (West 1993); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:130.1 (West 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-3 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-5 (Michie 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5105
(1983 & Supp. 1993).
119. 18. U.S.C.A. § 1512 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993).
120. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-124 (Michie 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.540
(1993); A2iz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2804 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-53-109 (Michie
1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.1 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-8-707 (West 1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-151 (West 1985 & Supp.
1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1263 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 215.10, -.11, -.12, -.13 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992).
121. James F. Thompson, Spoliation of Evidence: A Troubling New Tort, 37
U. KAN. L. REv. 567, 571 (1989).
122. Id.
123. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.24(c)(1) (1992).
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agement, statistical review, and the evaluation, prosecution,
and defense of medical malpractice claims. 124
The duty to maintain medical records for prescribed periods
of time is defined by statute in federal 125 and a large number of
state jurisdictions. 126 In addition, Illinois has a statute specifi-
cally requiring retention of X-rays for a prescribed period. 27
Contractual and common law duties to preserve other forms of
medical evidence also exist.128
. New York prohibits the fraudulent alteration of business
records, which include medical records. 129 California has en-
acted a criminal statute which prohibits the fraudulent altera-
tion of medical records by any individual. 130 A number of states
provide for professional disciplinary action when health care
providers inappropriately alter medical records. 131
Additionally, the health care profession has established
standards for quality and retention of medical records. One
124. Briggs W. Andrews, Medical Records Liability, A.B.A.F. ON HEALTH L.,
Summer 1992, at 11; JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH ORGANIZA-
TIONS, ACCREDITATION MANUALS FOR HOSPITALS 49 (1992).
125. 42 C.F.R. § 482.24(b)(1) (1991). This section includes among the Medi-
care Conditions of Participation: "[miedical records must be retained in their origi-
nal or legally reproduced form for a period of at least 5 years." Id.
126. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.20.085 (1993); HAw. REV. STAT. § 622-58 (1985 &
Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-1394, 41-3909 (Michie 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:2144 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.32 (West 1989); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-9-69, -71, -73, -77, -79 (1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 629.051
(1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-44-5 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-302, -305, -308
(1992); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 262.030, 281.073 (West 1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 42.1-79.1 (Michie 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.41.190 (West
1992).
127. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2. para. 157-11 (Smith-Hurd 1992). Arguably
this is superfluous, since X-rays can be considered a part of the medical record.
128. Wolf v. Lakewood Hosp., 598 N.E.2d 160 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
129. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 175.00 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994) (defining busi-
ness records as, "any writing or article, including computer data or a computer
program, kept or maintained by an enterprise for the purpose of evidencing or re-
flecting its condition or activity"); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 175.05-.10 (McKinney 1988
& Supp. 1994) (providing for misdemeanor and felony penalties, respectively).
130. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 471.5 (West 1988). This section states that
"[alny person who alters or modifies the medical record of any person, with fraudu-
lent intent.., is guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. However, CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE
§ 2262 (West 1990) merely provides for disciplinary action and a civil penalty when
a physician fraudulently alters the medical record.
131. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 471.5 (West 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 458.331(1)(m) (West 1991); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.3062 (1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-31-2(17)(h) (Supp. 1993).
17
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source of the professional standard is the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) Accredita-
tion Manual for Hospitals (AMH). 132 The professional code of
ethics also provides for the disclosure of medical records at the
patient's request to the patient or the patient's designated
party. 133
C. The Law of Bailments
A bailment may be defined as "the rightful possession of
goods by one who is not the owner."134 To establish a bailment,
the purported bailee must be in possession of the goods in ques-
tion, that is, must have physical control and the intent to exer-
cise such control. 135 A bailment is distinct from mere custody,
in which the owner transfers physical control without the intent
to relinquish dominion.136 Bailments may exist for the sole ben-
efit of the bailor, for the sole benefit of the bailee, or for mutual
benefit. 137 The degree of care required of the bailee to prevent
loss or damage to the bailed goods will vary with the type of
bailment, being greatest when only the bailee benefits, least
when only the bailor benefits, and "ordinary" when there is mu-
132. The Accreditation Manual for Hospitals provides in part that "[t]he hos-
pital maintains medical records that are documented accurately and in a timely
manner, are readily accessible, and permit prompt retrieval of information, includ-
ing statistical data." JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH ORGS., ACCREDI-
TATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 49 (1992); "[the medical record contains sufficient
information to, identify the patient, support the diagnosis, justify the treatment,
and document the course and results accurately." Id.; [miedical records are confi-
dential, secure, current, authenticated, legible, and complete." Id. at 52; "[t]he
medical record department is provided with adequate direction, staffing, and facili-
ties to perform all required functions." Id. at 53; and '[tihe length of time that
medical records are to be retained is dependent on the need for their use in contin-
uing patient care and for legal, research, and educational purposes and on law and
regulation." Id.
A duty to preserve surgical specimens for pathology evaluations, included in
earlier editions of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals AMH
(PA.3.1) was cited in Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1988) (quot-
ing JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH ORGS., ACCREDITATION MANUAL
FOR HOSPITAIS 130-31 (1980)).
133. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOC. COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS,
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, ANNOTATED CURRENT OPINIONS 58 (1992).
134. 9 SAMUEL WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS 875 (3d ed. 1967).
135. RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 10.2 (3d ed.
1975).
136. Id. § 10.4.
137. Id. §§ 11.1-.4.
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tual benefit. 3 8 The degree of care expected of the bailee may
increase with the value of the goods, 13 9 and with the nature of
the place in which the goods are kept.140 The bailee also owes a
duty to return the bailed goods to the bailor at the conclusion of
the bailment; misdelivery to a third party will subject the bailee
to liability regardless of the degree of care employed. 141
The bailor generally will not be in as good a position as the
bailee to prove the circumstances of the destruction or damage
of bailed goods. 42 Therefore, once the bailor has made a prima
facie case by showing delivery to the bailee and a failure of re-
turn or return of the bailed goods in a damaged condition, a pre-
sumption is created in favor of the bailor which shifts the
burden of production regarding negligence to the bailee. 143 This
presumption may be destroyed if the bailee can meet his burden
of going forward, shifting the burden of production back to the
bailor.'" Thus, in most jurisdictions, the burden of persuasion
remains with the bailor. 145 However, some courts have held
that if the bailment arises out of an express or implied contract,
the burden of persuasion shifts to the bailee upon the bailor's
making of a prima facie case. 146 Further, some courts have held
that whether the bailment exists in contract or not, certain
types of bailees will always have the burden of persuasion
shifted upon them.147 Certain bailees, such as common carriers,
are virtual insurers of bailed goods, 148 subject to certain excep-
tions.149 A significant characteristic of the common carrier is
that it holds itself out as offering carriage for hire to all those
138. Id. § 11.1 (citing JOSEPH F. STORY, BAiLENTs 27 (9th ed. 1878)).
139. See id. § 11.2 (citing Kittay v. Cordasco, 103 N.J.L. 156 (1926) (bailee
diamond dealer placed three loose diamonds in his pocket while attending public
auction)).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 11.7.
142. Id. § 11.8.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Warehousemen have been included in this category. See Rustad v.
Great N. Ry. Co., 142 N.W. 727 (Minn. 1913).
148. BROWN, supra note 135, §§ 12.5-.6.
149. Id. The exceptions are: "(1) the act of God..., [ ] (2) the act of the public
enemy. ... (3) the act of the state, (4) the act of the shipper, and (5) damages due
to the inherent nature of the goods themselves." Id.
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who wish to employ it.150 Policy reasons for imposing virtual
insurer status include the prevention of collusion among carri-
ers, and the encouragement of a high standard of care, 151 as well
as the unequal footing of the carrier and the customer. 152
Bailments have traditionally been treated as arising out of
contract. 153 In Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co.,154 the alleged
spoliator entered into what was essentially a bailment contract
with the plaintiff. The insured brought a contract action for
spoliation of evidence against a third party spoliator, her auto-
mobile insurer, alleging breach of promise to return a wrecked
automobile which she intended to use as evidence against the
manufacturer in a products liability action.1 55 While Florida
recognized the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence, 156 a con-
tract action for spoliation of evidence was not precluded. 57
Although the extent of damages to plaintiff by the spoliation
was uncertain, the rule of certainty did not bar recovery, since
several modifying factors existed.158 Further, in the interests of
150. Id. § 12.5.
151. Id. § 12.6.
152. Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
The case noted that "[t]he carrier and his customer do not stand upon a footing of
equality. The individual customer has no real freedom of choice." Id. at 441.
153. BROWN, supra note 135, § 10.1 (citing JosEPH F. STORY, BAILMENTS 5 (9th
ed. 1878), defining a bailment as "a delivery of a thing in trust for some special
object or purpose, and upon a contract express or implied, to conform to the object
or purpose of the trust").
154. 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
155. Id. at 25.
156. Id. at 27; see Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
157. Miller, 573 So. 2d at 27 (holding that, "[w]here the parties have a con-
tract, and the same act or transaction constitutes both a breach of the agreement,
express or implied, and a tort, the tort may be waived and the injured party may
sue on the contract").
158. Id. at 28-29. The court observed that:
There are various modifications to the rule of certainty. They enable the
courts, while holding up a high standard of certainty as an ideal, to avoid
applications of the rule to a harsh result. Among them are: (a) If the fact of
damage is proved with certainty, the extent or amount may be left to reason-
able inference. (b) Where the defendant's wrong has caused the difficulty of
proof of damage, he cannot complain of the resulting uncertainty. (c) Mere
difficulty in ascertaining the amount of damages is not fatal. (d) Mathemat-
ical precision in fixing the exact amount is not required. (e) If the best evi-
dence of the damage of which the situation admits is furnished, this is
sufficient. (f) The plaintiff may recover the value of his contract, and this
may be measured by the value of the expected profits. (g) Profits may some-
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judicial economy and to prevent piecemeal litigation, the court
saw no need to await a final outcome in the underlying products
liability case before bringing the spoliation action.'5 9 If the jury
found that the plaintiff failed to prove the underlying products
liability action, the same jury could then decide whether the
failure to prevail was due to the insurer's spoliation in breach of
contract.1
60
There is a duty of reasonable care to preserve evidence of
which the defendant's employee' 6' or agent 62 has voluntarily
taken custody, 163 has contracted to preserve' 64, or has a statu-
tory duty to preserve. 65 However, it is not always certain that
breach of a bailment will permit the remedy of the spoliation
inference. In Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,166 the plaintiff
was injured when a grinding wheel with which he was working
broke, causing facial injuries. 67 After a verdict was rendered
for the plaintiff on his strict liability cause of action, he moved
for additur.168 The plaintiff contended that the broken wheel,
which had been sent by his employer to the defendant manufac-
turer for inspection, had not been returned, but that a replace-
ment had been sent, thus weakening his case and reducing the
amount of the award.169 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that the duty owed by the bailee to the bailor is only that of
ordinary care; the possibility that the lost item would become
evidence in a future suit did not create a higher standard of care
times be proved as evidence of the damages, when they would not be directly
recoverable.
Id. at 28 n.4 (citing C. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 31, at 101-02 (1935)).
159. Id. at 28 n.7.
160. Id. at 31 n.13.
161. Pirocchi v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(defendant's employee, a claim adjuster, had voluntarily taken custody of evidence
for the purpose of an accident investigation).
162. Tomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 944 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
(plaintiffs insurer and insurer's agent were bailees of plaintiffs automobile which
agent disassembled).
163. Pirocchi, 365 F. Supp. at 281.
164. Miller, 573 So. 2d at 27.
165. Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp., 556 N.E.2d 913, 916 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990),
affd, 597 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. 1992); see infra notes 381-97 and accompanying text.
166. 211 N.W.2d 810 (Wis. 1973).
167. Id. at 812.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 819.
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on the part of the bailor. 170 The court affirmed the trial court's
decision not to invoke the spoliation inference, holding that it
was reserved for intentional acts, not mere negligence, even
though the outcome to the injured party might be the same. 171
III. Spoliation in the Medical Malpractice Arena
This section will review the applications of the spoliation
inference, discovery sanctions, the tort of spoliation, obstruction
of justice statutes, and record retention statutes in the medical
malpractice context. It should be remembered that while a
charge of spoliation is most frequently brought against a de-
fendant in a medical malpractice action, the charge is occasion-
ally raised against a plaintiff.172
A. Spoliation Inference
Despite the seemingly straightforward elements that must
be fulfilled in order to apply the spoliation inference, 173 courts
have treated the spoliation inference in the medical malpractice
context in variable fashions. Regarding the first element, de-
struction, one state court took what currently would be seen as
a lenient view of alteration of medical records. 174 In Furlong v.
Stokes,175 an entry in a patient's chart that he had suffered a
"burn area"176 due to proximity of the leg to a hot lamp during a
femoral saphenous bypass 177 was later overwritten with the
words "ulcer of the left knee, medial aspect".178 The court held,
inter alia, that this alteration was not equivalent to destruction
of the record or to an alteration or erasure of the record in-
tended to obliterate completely the underlying writing. 179 It
170. Id. at 821.
171. Id.
172. See infra notes 296-99, 305-13 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
174. Furlong v. Stokes, 427 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1968).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 519.
177. Id. at 515-16. A femoral saphenous bypass is a procedure in which a
portion of a large leg vein, the saphenous vein, is grafted onto a large leg artery,
the femoral artery, replacing the occluded portion. STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY
123, 224, 1703 (25th ed. 1990).
178. Furlong, 427 S.W.2d at 519.
179. Id.
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was not considered a spoliation, and an inference would not be
permitted which would make plaintiffs prima facie case for
negligence. 180
Regarding the second element, relevancy, destruction of ev-
idence as a matter of routine procedure unrelated to litigation
will not give rise to the spoliation inference.'18 For example,
routinely discarding admission slips and carbons after tran-
scribing the information to the permanent record will not give
rise to the spoliation inference. 8 2 Nor will mere de minimis al-
teration of evidence that does not interfere with its evidentiary
value to the proffering party give rise to the inference. 8 3 How-
ever, in Bettis v. Marshall,8 4 a draft of the post-mortem report,
more clearly stating the cause of death than did the final report,
had not been produced in response to plaintiffs discovery re-
quest. 8 5 Further, defendants' counsel had written a letter to
the physicians' malpractice insurance carrier, expressing the
hope that the draft report would not make its way into plain-
tiffs hands, since it was felt to be damaging to defendants. 8 6
The trial court denied the motion in limine of two of the physi-
cians to exclude the attorney's letter. 8 7 The Alabama Supreme
Court denied defendants' request for mandamus to exclude the
letter,88 rejecting the dissent's position that the letter was non-
discoverable attorney work product, and that the draft post-
mortem report was not part of the records concerning the de-
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
182. Baykian v. White, No. 05-90-00929-CV, 1991 WL 141769 (Tex. Ct. App.
July 29, 1991) (holding that where actual time of admission of maternity patient
with prolapsed cord was in issue, routine destruction of admission slip, unrelated
to the litigation, did not manifest the bad faith necessary to raise the spoliation
inference).
183. Martin v. Reed, 409 S.E.2d 874 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that hospi-
tal's placing of "mark" on X-ray did not constitute spoliation), cert. denied, 428
S.E.2d 91 (Ga. 1991).
184. 549 So. 2d 23 (Ala. 1989) (per curiam). The deceased had been admitted
to the hospital with what later proved to be a hypersensitivity reaction to Dilantin,
but was given a large intravenous dose of the same drug, which caused her rapid
death. Id. at 24 (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Dilantin is
phenytoin, an anti-seizure medication. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1708-10
(26th ed. 1992).
185. Bettis, 549 So. 2d at 24.
186. Id. at 23 n.1, 24.
187. Id. at 24-25.
188. Id. at 23-25.
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ceased's medical treatment, but simply a document concerning
her autopsy.18 9
The third element, intent, has been a particularly signifi-
cant hurdle for the victim of spoliation to overcome. Since the
spoliation inference permits, but does not require, a conclusion
regarding the harm to the spoliator of the missing evidence, the
jury's determination of the spoliator's intent may be critical.190
Sims v. Callahan'91 was an action for intentional fraudulent
misrepresentation and malpractice for the allegedly unneces-
sary recommendation of cataract surgery.192 In Sims, the Ala-
bama Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in
admitting a copy of plaintiffs medical record kept by defendant
when the original was lost, but not through defendant's negli-
gence. 193 No indication was given as to how the originals were
lost. 9
Similarly, in Walker v. United States,195 where the issue of
causation was confounded by the fact that the fetal monitoring
strips could not be located, presumably having been lost by the
microfilming firm employed by the hospital,196 the court noted
that no adverse inference would arise from the absence of the
189. Id. at 26-27. The dissent, however, did not explain how the hope ex-
pressed in the letter of preventing discovery of the draft constituted a mental im-
pression or legal theory constituting attorney work product, nor why this explicit
statement of attempted concealment should not give rise to an inference of negli-
gence. Id.
190. In DiLeo v. Nugent, 592 A.2d 1126 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), a patient
who sued her psychiatrist for post-traumatic stress syndrome allegedly caused by
his use of psychedelic drugs and sexual intercourse in his therapy destroyed an
800-page journal. Id. at 1129-30. On appeal, the defendant contended that the
spoliation instruction against plaintiff was improper. Id. at 1131. The Maryland
court held that the jury was properly instructed that while unexplained destruc-
tion of evidence could lead to the inference that the destroyed evidence was unfa-
vorable to the spoliator's position, the jury could (but was not required to) accept
the party's explanation for destruction of the evidence. Id. at 1132. See Miller v.
Montgomery County, 494 A.2d 761 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 498 A.2d
1185 (Md. 1985).
191. 112 So. 2d 776 (Ala. 1959).
192. Id. at 778.
193. Id. at 789.
194. Id. The cursory treatment given the issue may have been due in part to
the novel fact situation, as well as to the fact that plaintiff had not objected at trial
that such copy was not the "best evidence." Id.
195. 600 F. Supp. 195 (D.D.C. 1985).
196. Id. at 198 n.6.
258
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strips.1 9 7 There was no evidence that the hospital had deliber-
ately destroyed them, or had exercised less than due diligence
in attempting to recover them.19 The court never reached the
question of whether any consequences would accrue to the hos-
pital for non-negligent loss of evidence, or whether the micro-
filming company could be impleaded by the hospital as its
bailee for damages awarded to plaintiff as a result of the lost
strips. 199
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, while not pre-
cluding the inference for non-intentional destruction of records,
left the decision to the trial court's discretion. In Battocchi v.
Washington Hospital Center,200 in which the plaintiff alleged
that her infant son's skull fractures, intracranial bleeding, and
subsequent neurologic damage were caused by defendant's neg-
ligent performance of a forceps delivery, 2 1 the original record
containing a nurse's progress note describing the delivery was
lost and the copies produced did not contain the nurse's notes. 202
A hospital representative explained that the chart, last checked
out to the head of risk management, had possibly been lost in
the physical move of the risk management department to an-
other building.20 3 Judgment was entered for the hospital at the
trial court level.2°4 Plaintiffs appeal contended that the trial
court had erred in not submitting the issue of the missing evi-
dence to the jury and in not giving a "missing evidence
instruction."205
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Compare Tomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 944 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992). The court held that a bailment existed when plaintiffs insurer deliv-
ered her motor vehicle to a salvage yard as its agent. Id. at 946. When the vehicle
was redelivered with parts missing, plaintiff sought as consequential damages the
injury to her products liability cause of action which alteration of the vehicle had
caused. Id. The court declined to recognize the tort of spoliation, stating that no
evidence existed that plaintiff had as yet unsuccessfully pursued a products liabil-
ity claim, or that destroyed evidence would have allowed her to successfully pursue
it. Id. at 948.
200. 581 A.2d 759 (D.C. 1990).
201. Id. at 761.
202. Id. at 762.
203. Id. at 762-63.
204. Id. at 761.
205. Id. at 764.
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The court of appeals attempted to distinguish "true spolia-
tion" (destruction of evidence in bad faith or with reckless disre-
gard for the relevance of the evidence) from mere failure to
preserve evidence (loss of evidence through negligence or acci-
dent).206 The court implied that if the loss of evidence were in-
tentional or reckless, the spoliation inference was mandatory, 20 7
but if spoliation were merely negligent, the choice whether or
not to raise the inference lay within the trial court's
discretion.208
The court noted that if spoliation did not rise to the level of
recklessness, the inference of consciousness of a weak case is
not supported.20 9 However, even for negligent non-production,
the inference could be drawn that if the evidence were favorable
to the non-producing party, it would have taken greater pains to
preserve it.210 Since it was not stated whether the trial court
found the spoliation to be intentional or reckless as opposed to
negligent, the record was remanded for a specific finding.21'
Although Battocchi appeared to be hostile to the spoliation
inference, the same court relied on Battocchi a year later in Wil-
liams v. Washington Hospital Center,21 2 holding that the trial
court had abused its discretion in not raising the inference. 213
Plaintiffs expert was to examine an ocular foreign body at
trial.21 4 Only on the last day of trial, when plaintiffs expert was
206. Id. at 765-66.
207. Id. at 766-67.
208. Id. at 767.
209. Id. at 766 (citing CHARLEs T. McCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 273, at 809 (3d. ed. 1984).
210. Id. at 766.
211. Id. at 768.
212. 601 A.2d 28 (D.C. 1991). Plaintiff was struck in the eye while chipping
cement, and experienced ocular pain and visual disturbance. Id. at 30. Although
initial evaluation revealed no foreign body, five months later, the plaintiff suffered
sudden loss of vision. Id. Reevaluation revealed a foreign body in the affected eye.
Id. A small, sharp, metallic foreign body was removed. Id. Permanent visual im-
pairment ensued. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the physician was negligent in
failing to detect and remove the foreign body at the initial examination. Id. De-
fendant contended that the foreign body was not present at the time of initial ex-
amination, for if it had been, it would have left a visible track or "footprint" as it
penetrated into the eye, and no track was seen. Id.
213. Id. at 34-35.
214. Id. at 33. Based upon the description of the object, he was prepared to
testify that because the foreign body was sharp and narrow, it would not have left
a track as the defendant had contended it would. Id.
260 [Vol. 14:235
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due to testify, was it revealed that the foreign body had been
lost.215 Plaintiff moved for default judgment, which was de-
nied.216 Plaintiff then moved for an adverse inference. 217 The
trial court held that the defendant had not demonstrated bad
faith or gross negligence, nor had the loss of evidence prejudiced
plaintiff, and denied the request for the inference. 218
On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that factors to be
considered in exercising the court's discretion were the degree
of fault, the importance of the evidence, and the availability of
other evidence enabling the deprived party to make the same
point.219 Here, the court found that the trial court had abused
its discretion in denying the inference. 220 The trial court's find-
ings regarding the lack of importance of the evidence and lack of
prejudice to plaintiff were held to be clearly erroneous. 22'
The fourth element needed to raise the spoliation inference
is that litigation must be pending or at least foreseeable at the
time of destruction. The court in May v. Moore222 held that evi-
dence of destruction of documents may be admitted even though
the litigation was not pending at the time of destruction.223 The
original hospital chart had been "lost," but a hospital adminis-
trator had made a copy before the original was lost.224 At depo-
sition, Dr. May produced two copies of the chart, but the
215. Id. at 30. The foreign body had already been used in discovery, and coun-
sel had agreed that it should be maintained in the plaintiffs medical record, in
defendant's custody. Id. at 31. Apparently, the chairman of the ophthalmology
department wished to remove the object in order to determine its radiopacity by
subjecting it to X-ray examination. Id. at 32. Counsel for defendant indicated that
this could be destructive testing, and instructed the chairman not to remove it. Id.
Nevertheless, the chairman removed the object from the chart, whereupon it was
lost. Id. Although defense counsel was aware that the object was lost at the outset
of the trial, he did not inform plaintiff until the last day of trial. Id. at 31.
216. Id. at 31.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 32.
220. Id. at 35.
221. Id. at 34. Note that the metallic object had been entrusted to the hospi-
tal for safekeeping. Id. at 31. Although not specifically discussed in the opinion,
Williams represents another case in which the court could have, but did not, treat
spoliation of evidence in a manner analogous to a lost bailment. See supra notes
195-99 and accompanying text.
222. 424 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1982).
223. Id. at 603.
224. Id.
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administrator noted discrepancies between her copy and the
copies produced by Dr. May. 225 The trial court found that this
circumstantial evidence of alteration and attempted destruction
of the record was sufficient to raise the inference of negli-
gence. 226 Denial of the doctor's motion in limine to suppress
this evidence was upheld on appeal. 227
The fifth element requires that the destruction be carried
out by a party or his agent. In McHugh v. Audet 228 an officer of
the local medical society, of which both plaintiff's and defend-
ant's expert witnesses were members, had unsuccessfully at-
tempted to persuade plaintiffs witness not to testify.229 The
court held that since defendants had no knowledge of the of-
ficer's actions, the mere fact that defendant's witnesses were
members of the same medical society did not make the officer
an agent of defendant. 230 Thus, the trial court had not abused
its discretion in refusing to permit introduction of evidence re-
garding the tampering.231
Whether the spoliation inference implies merely that the
destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the spolia-
tor, or creates an implication of weakness of his case as a whole,
also varies. In Carr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
2 3 2
the court held that the jury had been properly instructed to con-
sider evidence that part of decedent's medical record had been
destroyed. 23 3 Though it was never stated whether this destruc-
tion was intentional, negligent, or innocent, the court held that
since plaintiff was hampered in proving what the examination
had disclosed, it was appropriate to raise an inference that the
record would have shown that decedent's vital signs were
abnormal.234
225. Id.
226. Id. Testimony was also admitted that medical records of other patients
of Dr. May were missing. Id.
227. Id.
228. 72 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
229. Id. at 404.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 404-05. Moreover, since the attempt was unsuccessful, plaintiffs
cause of action did not appear to have been prejudiced. Id. at 404.
232. 384 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Ark. 1974).
233. Id. at 831.
234. Id. One court has extended the spoliation inference to encompass evi-
dence of the standard of care. In Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636, rehjg
262 [Vol. 14:235
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Some courts have extended the spoliation inference to the
weakness of the spoliator's case as a whole. In Thor v. Boska235
original clinical records could not be produced,236 but defendant
claimed to have recopied them verbatim in a more legible form
at the time that plaintiff informed him she was seeking the care
of another physician.237 However, defendant's account of when
treatment began conflicted with plaintiffs testimony.238 Be-
cause the defendant partially admitted negligence, the trial
court ruled that admission of testimony regarding the non-
availability of the original record would be unduly prejudi-
cial.239 On appeal, it was noted that defendant had only admit-
ted breach of duty but denied proximate cause and damages, 240
and the trial court was held to have abused its discretion by
suppressing evidence of defendant's loss of the original
records. 241 Since defendant's admission of negligence was
ephemeral, his inability to produce the original records created
a strong inference of consciousness of guilt,242 and affected the
spoliating party's case as a whole; admission of a single issue
did not neutralize the overall effect of the spoliation. 243
An attempt to intimidate the opposing party's witnesses
can give rise to a spoliation inference applied to the spoliator's
case as a whole.2" In Meyer v. McDonnell 245 the defendant
threatened to have the testimony of plaintiffs standard of care
witness transcribed and disseminated to the witness's local
denied, 520 P.2d 361 (Or. 1974), an action for the wrongful death of a stillborn
child, a false entry was made that the fetal heartbeat had been monitored every
half-hour, even though there was testimony that at one point monitoring had not
occurred for an hour. Id. at 641. The court held that the jury could have reason-
ably inferred that the false entry was made out of realization that monitoring
every half-hour was the customary practice, or because the physician had ordered
her to do so. Id. Because of this inference, the standard of care by which the negli-
gence of the nurse was to be measured was not a matter requiring expert testi-
mony. Id. at 640-41.
235. 113 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App. 1974) (claiming negligent failure to diagnose
and negligent treatment of plaintiffs breast cancer).
236. Id. at 298.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 299-300.
241. Id. at 301.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 302-03.
244. Meyer v. McDonnell, 392 A.2d 1129 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
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medical society, causing the witness to refuse to testify.2 4 6 The
court of appeals found the judge's instruction that attempted
intimidation of a witness would give rise to an inference that
the testimony would be unfavorable, but should not be consid-
ered as substantive proof of negligence, too narrow. 247 The
court noted "the distinction between a mere failure to produce
specific evidence and fraudulent conduct aimed at suppressing
or spoliating evidence."248
Some courts have applied what has been termed the spolia-
tion inference as a presumption. In Welsh v. United States249
the Sixth Circuit held that negligent destruction of evidence
gave rise to a rebuttable presumption on the issues of negli-
gence and proximate cause.250 A flap of skull bone, needed by
the plaintiff's expert to demonstrate the time of onset of fatal E.
coli 251 chronic osteomyelitis 252 and thus critical to the plaintiffs
carrying her burden as to proximate cause, had been dis-
carded. 253 The specimen should have been sent for a pathology
evaluation, as is the usual custom and as is generally required
245. Id. The plaintiff alleged that Dr. McDonnell had negligently performed
surgery on his back, resulting in loss of bowel and bladder control and impotence.
Id. at 1130.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1134.
248. Id. at 1132. The court noted that:
It has always been understood that the inference, indeed, is one of the sim-
plest in human experience that a party's falsehood or other fraud in the
preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of
evidence by bribery or spoliation, and all similar conduct, is receivable
against him as an indication of his consciousness that his case is a weak or
unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself
of the cause's lack of truth and merit. The inference thus does not apply
itself necessarily to any specific fact in the cause, but operates, indefinitely
though strongly, against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting his
cause.
Id. (citing JOHN WiGMORE, 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 278 at 120 (3d ed. 1940));
see also May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1982).
249. 844 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1988).
250. Id. at 1245.
251. E. (Escherichia) coli is a gram negative bacterium normally present in
the large intestine, but which is pathogenic when present in other parts of the
body. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 536 (25th ed. 1990).
252. Chronic osteomyelitis is a chronic "inflammation of the bone marrow and
adjacent bone." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1109 (25th ed. 1990).
253. Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1239.
264
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for specimens removed at surgery.254 The district court held
that the defendant's agents negligently failed to diagnose and
treat the decedent's infection. 25 5 Defendant appealed the dis-
trict court's judgment for plaintiff, arguing that the verdict was
based on insufficient evidence of negligence and proximate
cause, and on impermissible inferences by the district court.256
The court of appeals held that, while not negligence per se,
this violation of a procedural requirement was determined to be
grossly negligent, if not intentional. 257 Because the plaintiff
was unable to carry her burden of proof regarding proximate
cause due to the loss of the bone flap, the Sixth Circuit held that
the district court properly applied Kentucky law in creating a
rebuttable presumption of liability on the part of defendant.258
This presumption did not merely shift the burden of production,
but shifted the burden of persuasion as well. 259 The court noted
that two state appellate courts260 and a federal district court 261
had endorsed the idea of shifting the burden of persuasion by
creation of a rebuttable presumption against a health care pro-
vider who negligently destroyed or lost records of medical
care.
262
254. Id. at 1243.
255. Id. at 1242.
256. Id. at 1239.
257. Id. at 1244. The court noted that the Veterans Administration Hospital
was governed by the provisions of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospi-
tals (JCAH) (now Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Organizations -
JCAHO) regarding handling of surgical specimens. Id. at 1243-44. The JCAH
1980 Manual provided: "Specimens removed during a surgical procedure shall or-
dinarily be sent to the pathologist for evaluation .... Every gross specimen sent to
the laboratory shall be evaluated by a pathologist .... " Id. (citing JOINT COmmis-
SION ON ACCREDITATION OF HosprrALs, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HosPrrALs,
130-31 (1980). The bone flap did not come within any of the exemptions from send-
ing a surgical specimen for pathology examination provided in the manual. Welsh,
844 F.2d at 1244.
258. Id. at 1245.
259. Id. at 1246-47.
260. Id. (citing Public Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 599-601 (Fla.
1987)); Thor v. Boska, 113 Cal. Rptr. 296, 303 n. 8 (Ct. App. 1974) (dicta).
261. Id. at 1247 (citing Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545 (W.D. Okla. 1979)
(negligent destruction of autopsy material warranting more than a rebuttable
presumption)).
262. Id.
2651994]
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One of the most severe decisions concerning loss of medical
records is Valcin v. Public Health Trust.263 Plaintiffs expert
could not reach a definite conclusion regarding negligence since
no operative report was found in the hospital record. 264 The
trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant. 26 5
The district court of appeal held that the hospital had both a
moral and a statutory duty to ensure that an operative report
was made and to maintain medical records, in part to promote
the public health.266 The court held that since plaintiff was
prejudiced in her attempt to meet her burden of production and
persuasion in demonstrating defendant's negligence, a pre-
sumption against defendant should be created. 267 Defendant
would have the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of evi-
dence to show that the loss of records was not deliberate. 268 If
defendant met this burden, then a rebuttable presumption of
negligence would arise.269 If, however, defendant failed to meet
this burden, then an irrebuttable presumption would arise, and
a judgment against defendant would be entered.270
This decision was partially modified on appeal to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court.271 The court found that an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of negligence, establishing the liability of the party
responsible for the loss of evidence, violated due process since it
deprived the spoliator of the opportunity to rebut the presump-
tion of negligence. 272 However, the court agreed that a rebutta-
ble presumption against the spoliator which shifted the burden
263. 473 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), modified, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla.
1987) (malpractice action alleging negligent performance of a bilateral tubal liga-
tion resulting in a ruptured ectopic pregnancy).
264. Id. at 1304.
265. Id. at 1300.
266. Id. at 1305 n.7, 1306.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. The court declined to decide whether burden shifting would occur if
the records were lost due to an act of God. Id. at 1306 n.9. In this case, a private
right of action based upon a statute was not involved; instead, a statute was in-
voked to establish the duty upon which a spoliation presumption could be based.
Id. at 1305-06. Cf. Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp., 597 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. 1992) (holding
that the Illinois X-Ray Retention Act provided the victim of spoliation with a pri-
vate cause of action).
271. Public Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987).
272. Id. at 597.
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of persuasion, not merely the burden of production, was
appropriate. 273
Another jurisdiction has not allowed a statutory duty to
preserve records to create a true presumption of negligence in
the underlying malpractice action, rebuttable or otherwise. 274
In DeLaughter the plaintiff claimed error for, inter alia, the fail-
ure of the trial court to give any of plaintiffs three proposed
jury instructions regarding the hospital's failure to maintain
medical records275 as required by statute.276 The Mississippi
Supreme Court rejected each of plaintiff's three proposed in-
structions. 277 The first was rejected because it would have
raised an irrebuttable presumption of negligence on the wrong-
ful death cause of action against the defendant if the destruc-
tion of records was found to be intentional,278 which the court
held to be impermissible. 279 The second proposed instruction
was rejected because it created an improper inference of negli-
gent treatment from the failure to maintain records.280 The
third proposed instruction was rejected because it shifted the
burden on the negligence issue to the defendant.281 The court
held that a proper instruction would create a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the missing information was unfavorable to the
spoliator, and would also shift the burden to the spoliator to
show that it had not destroyed or misplaced the records. 28 2
273. Id. at 599-601. The court did not address what distinction, if any, was to
be made between merely negligent spoliation and intentional spoliation.
274. DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818 (Miss. 1992).
275. Id. at 821. The hospital's director of nursing instructed the medical
records custodian to lock up the records so that the family could not obtain them,
but the custodian found that the records were already missing. Id. The hospital
attempted to reconstruct the records from photocopies, but the reconstructed
records lacked the admission history and physical, and nurse's notes for a critical
period of the hospitalization. Id. Some of the nurse's missing notes were found in
the possession of the hospital's attorney who had not produced them during discov-
ery. Id.
276. Id. (citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-9-63 (1972) and Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-9-
69 (Supp. 1990)).
277. Id. at 822-23.
278. Id. at 822.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 822-23.
281. Id. at 823.
282. Id. The court wished to limit the spoliation "inference" (here, a rebutta-
ble presumption) to the unfavorable nature of the missing evidence, but did not
wish to raise an inference regarding the weakness of the spoliator's case as a
1994] 267
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B. Discovery Sanctions
Monetary sanctions may be imposed for failure to comply
with a court order to produce evidence when it causes the plain-
tiff to incur additional expense. 283 Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(b)(2), monetary sanctions are appropriate even
when one acting as a party's agent is directly responsible for
nondisclosure. 28
Failure to disclose one's expert witnesses in a timely man-
ner is a form of spoliation which has led to the preclusion sanc-
tion.285 In Bradley, a medical malpractice action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, the government answered plaintiffs'
interrogatories which requested the identities of its expert wit-
nesses by stating it had not yet identified such witnesses. The
government failed to supplement this response until a few days
before trial,2 86 citing budgetary constraints and bureaucratic
policy reasons.287 The plaintiffs were able to depose the experts
before trial, and the district court granted the government's mo-
tion to allow its experts to testify.288 Judgment was entered for
the government. 28 9
The court of appeals held that the trial court had abused its
discretion in allowing the experts to testify,290 noting that such
action violated its own pretrial order to timely identify ex-
perts,291 disadvantaged the plaintiffs since the experts' testi-
whole. Id. Similarly, the court wished to limit burden shifting to the issue of
whether the spoliator destroyed or misplaced the records, but not the burden re-
garding the underlying cause of action. Id.
283. May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596, 604-05 (Ala. 1982) (also raising the spolia-
tion inference against defendant's case as a whole); see supra notes 222-27 and
accompanying text.
284. Id. at 604-05 (applying Alabama's equivalent of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)).
285. Bradley v. United States, 866 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1989).
286. Id. at 123.
287. Id. at 126.
288. Id. at 123.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 127. The trial court's discretion was to be guided by : 0(1) the im-
portance of the witness's testimony; (2) the prejudice to the opposing party of al-
lowing the witness to testify; (3) the possibility of curing such prejudice by
granting a continuance; and (4) the explanation, if any, for the party's failure to
identify the witness.' Id. at 125 (citing Murphy v. Magnolia Elec. Power Ass'n, 639
F.2d 232, 235 (5th Cir. Mar. 1981)).
291. Id. at 124.
268 [Vol. 14:235
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss1/6
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
mony went to the central issue of the case,292 and that the
plaintiffs were able to depose the experts only a few days before
trial.293 The case was remanded for a new trial with leave for
the government to present its experts, but the district court was
instructed to impose appropriate sanctions294 to fulfill the
court's truth-seeking and punitive functions. 295
Destructive examination of evidence has also led to the pre-
clusion sanction. In Barker v. Bledsoe296 the district court re-
jected the notion that a mere rebuttable presumption against
the spoliator would suffice. 297 The court implied that before a
party embarks upon a destructive examination of evidence,
there is a duty to provide notice to the other party so that it may
have an opportunity to examine the evidence before destruc-
tion.298 The plaintiff was barred from introducing any evidence
from the examination, including the testimony of plaintiffs
expert.299
If an expert witness for only one party has had the opportu-
nity to inspect physical evidence before its destruction, a hard-
ship will accrue to the opposing party.300 Such a situation has
been held to warrant disclosure by the expert of the facts sur-
rounding the inspection, but not the expert's opinions.30 1 Also,
when the altered or destroyed article can be replaced, the spoli-
ator may be permitted to recreate the article as an alternative
to preclusion. 30 2 However, if there is insufficient evidence of
292. Id. at 125.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 127-28.
295. Id. at 128. Granting a continuance would have cured all prejudice
against plaintiff, but would not have punished the government or deterred future
failures to comply with discovery. Id. at 125-26.
296. 85 F.R.D. 545 (W.D. Okla. 1979) (where plaintiff's expert performed an
autopsy upon plaintiff's deceased wife that was so destructive that defendant could
not perform his own examination).
297. Id. at 547.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 549.
300. Rosario v. General Motors Corp., 148 A-D.2d 108, 111, 543 N.Y.S.2d 974,
975 (1st Dep't 1989) (automobile examined by plaintiff's expert destroyed before
defendant's expert could inspect it).
301. Calo v. Ahearn, 135 A.D.2d 457, 522 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1st Dep't 1987).
302. Goens v. Vogelstein, 146 A.D.2d 606, 536 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 1989)
(holding that testimony of plaintiff's expert concerning X-rays he had reviewed,
but which were lost before defendant's expert could examine them, was not pre-
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willful spoliation, the court may refuse to issue discovery sanc-
tions, even if meaningful reconstruction is not possible.303 This
approach is at odds with the tendency to issue discovery sanc-
tions for even negligent spoliation if it causes severe prejudice
to the victim. 30 4
Dismissal of a cause of action with prejudice, though an ex-
treme measure, was utilized in Pavlinko v. Yale.305 Plaintiff
had removed from the hospital the original medical records of
his deceased wife the day after her death and retained them for
over two years.306 At deposition, plaintiff repeatedly invoked
the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned con-
cerning the reliability and integrity of the record.30 7 On defend-
ant's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint.308 On
appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that dismissal was
the appropriate sanction.30 9 Nonsuiting the plaintiff would
merely allow him to bring the same action within a year310 and
awarding costs would not likely produce the desired informa-
tion.311 An order establishing facts or precluding evidence was
held to be inapplicable. 3 2 An order to comply was held to be
cluded, on the condition that plaintiff undergo new X-rays and disclose the reports
concerning the missing X-rays).
303. Id. While the initial X-rays were obtained in 1984, replacement X-rays
were ordered in 1989. Id. at 606, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 526-27. Arguably, the replace-
ment X-rays did not recreate the plaintiffs clinical condition at the time the origi-
nal X-rays were obtained. See also Parascandola v. Kaplan, 108 A.D.2d 738 (2d
Dep't 1985) (mem.) (discovery sanctions not imposed when defendant hospital did
not deliberately destroy evidence but was mislead by misinformation from one of
its own nurses).
304. See DePuy, Inc. v. Eckes, 427 So. 2d 306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (hold-
ing that discovery sanctions are appropriate regardless of the degree of
culpability).
305. 470 A.2d 246 (Conn. 1984).
306. Id. at 248.
307. Id. at 248-50.
308. Id. at 250.
309. Id. The court listed factors to be considered in determining the appropri-
ateness of a sanction, including: (1) whether deponent's failure to respond was due
to inability or bad faith; (2) the degree of harm caused to the opposing party; and
(3) the appropriateness of the sanction given the circumstances. Id.
310. Id. at 250-51.
311. Id. at 251.
312. Id. The court did not explain why raising an inference that plaintiff had
altered the record was inapplicable. Id.
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ineffective, since plaintiff did not indicate at hearing that he
would comply if so ordered.313
Although not guilty of destroying evidence directly or
through an agent, lack of diligence can lead to discovery sanc-
tions against a dilatory plaintiff. In Carroll v. Kimmel,314 while
plaintiff delayed fifty-eight months between filing a notice of
complaint and the complaint itself,315 the non-party hospital
had appropriately disposed of X-rays as a matter of routine rec-
ord destruction.316 The court granted a judgment of non prose-
quitur for defendant, since plaintiffs lack of diligence in
prosecuting its cause of action resulted in prejudice against de-
fendant by virtue of the appropriate destruction of X-rays.317
The plaintiffs lack of diligence was found to fulfill the destruc-
tion element for imposition of discovery sanctions because her
inaction made the evidence unavailable.31 8
Discovery sanctions against one party may act to preclude
the spoliation inference against the other. In Kilker v. Mulry
31 9
plaintiff alleged that the hospital, a party-defendant, had al-
tered records to omit references to prior vaginal bleeding so as
to avoid liability for failure to earlier diagnose placenta
previa. 320 Judgment was returned for defendant. 321 On appeal,
the Iowa Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that the trial court
had not abused its discretion in barring testimony of plaintiffs
document expert. 322 Although plaintiff had been in possession
of the expert's report for seven months, he failed to disclose the
identity of this witness at least thirty days before trial.323 Even
313. Id. The court noted that the privilege against self-incrimination is a
shield against self-conviction in a criminal matter, not a sword to deny the oppos-
ing party discoverable information in a civil case. Id.
314. 524 A.2d 954 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
315. Id. at 955-56.
316. Id. at 957.
317. Id. at 956.
318. Id. at 956-57. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
319. 437 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
320. Id. at 3. Placenta pr[alevia is a condition in which the placenta is abnor-
mally positioned so as to block the unborn child's path of exit through the birth
canal. STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY 1206 (25th ed. 1990).
321. Id. at 2.
322. Id. at 3-4.
323. Id. at 4 (citing IowA R.- Cir. P. § 125(c), which provides the court the dis-
cretion to exclude or limit the expert's testimony if the expert's identity is not dis-
closed in compliance with the rule).
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though failure to disclose was not willful, the trial court barred
the expert's testimony. 24 Without the expert's testimony,
plaintiff was unable to produce other evidence that would per-
mit an instruction to the jury that the burden had shifted to the
defendant to show that it had not altered the records.3 25 In ef-
fect, plaintiffs non-willful spoliation by failure to comply with
discovery procedure precluded the possibility of raising the spo-
liation inference for defendant's alleged willful alteration of
records. 326
An order to produce, and discovery sanctions for failure to
comply, will not issue if the desired information is protected by
the physician-patient privilege. 27 In Dierickx, defendant's mo-
tion to compel physical examination of plaintiffs two sisters and
production of their records to show that her disorder was ge-
netic, rather than due to birth injury, was denied.3 28 On appeal,
the court upheld the denials, holding that the sisters' records
were protected by the statutory physician-patient privilege 29
which had not been waived by her sisters or by plaintiff on their
behalf, and that the sisters' physical conditions had not been
placed in issue.330 The strength of the privilege outweighed the
defendant's assertion that plaintiff invoked the privilege solely
to conceal evidence.33'
A party's innocent failure to disclose evidence which is not
prejudicial to the opponent may not give rise to sanctions or
other corrective action.332 In Bohus, the plaintiffs failure to dis-
close a post-treatment consultation allowed her to toll the stat-
ute of limitations on a podiatric malpractice action.333 The
324. Id. at 6.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 6-7.
327. Dierickx v. Cottage Hosp. Corp., 393 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
328. Id. at 565.
329. Id. at 566 (citing MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.2157 which provides that
plaintiff may waive the privilege on her own behalf in a personal injury or mal-
practice action by calling a physician to testify).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 567 (noting that the position expressed in State ex rel Lester E. Cox
Medical Ctr. v. Keet, 678 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. 1984) that the search for truth may
require the disclosure of redacted medical records of non-party patients is a minor-
ity view).
332. Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1991).
333. Id. at 923.
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Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that granting a new trial
for defendant was inappropriate, since the nondisclosure was
apparently innocent, and since the nondisclosure not only was
not prejudicial to defendant, but the undisclosed information
actually would have made plaintiffs position regarding tolling
the statute of limitations stronger.334 For a new trial to be
granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the newly
discovered evidence must be such that it would probably have
changed the outcome of the trial.335
C. Spoliation Tort
The independent tort of intentional spoliation of evidence
in a medical malpractice case may have been recognized in
North Carolina under a different name in Henry v. Deen.336
Although never explicitly mentioning the tort of spoliation of
evidence, the court recognized a claim for civil conspiracy to al-
ter medical records which impeded the investigation of plain-
tiffs malpractice claim.337 The North Carolina Supreme Court
held that a cause of action for civil conspiracy to alter medical
records was not equivalent to an impermissible civil remedy for
perjury.338 The court apparently found the critical aspect of the
cause of action to be the injury resulting from the conspiracy,
not the conspiracy itself.3 39 Although intentional spoliation as
an independent tort was not mentioned by name, the civil con-
spiracy cause of action for deliberately destroying records ful-
fills the elements of the tort of intentional spoliation.340
334. Id. at 930-31.
335. Id. at 931 (citing Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983)).
336. 310 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 1984).
337. Id. at 336. Plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to and did create
false and misleading entries in decedent's medical record, obliterated another en-
try on the chart, destroyed or concealed the actual medical record of the decedent,
and held out the fraudulent record as the actual record. Id. at 331, 334.
338. Id. at 335 (citing Gillikin v. Springle, 118 S.E.2d 611 (N.C. 1961); Gillikin
v. Bell, 118 S.E.2d 608 (N.C. 1961); Brewer v. Carolina Coach, 116 S.E.2d 725
(N.C. 1960)). In fact, plaintiff's complaint, which included the conspiracy allega-
tion, "was apparently filed before any discovery in which sworn statements were
made" and therefore, before defendants could be subject to criminal sanctions for
perjury. Id.
339. Id.
340. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. The holding would not vio-
late the policy favoring finality ofjudgments, since the case at bar had not yet been
adjudicated upon the merits, and the liberal joinder of plaintiffs malpractice and
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Bondu v. Gurvich341 "adopted a new cause of action for neg-
ligent spoliation of hospital records."342 Plaintiff alleged that
the hospital was negligent per se in failing to provide certain
medical records, and in the alternative had deliberately lost or
destroyed certain records, frustrating her ability to pursue
proof necessary to establish her case.343 After failing to carry
her burden regarding negligence, plaintiff moved for leave to
amend her complaint to add a count charging defendant with
negligent loss of records and filed a separate cause of action
charging the same negligent loss of records. 344 The lower court
held that dismissal with prejudice of the loss of record counts
barred the new action by res judicata.345
While the court of appeals held it appropriate to deny leave
to amend the complaint since the proposed amendment stated a
new cause of action not pleaded in or accrued at the time of the
original complaint, 346 it ruled that the spoliation claim was a
new cause of action and was not barred by res judicata.347 A
cause of action for damage to plaintiffs suit was not ripe until
she had lost her original suit, and therefore, that issue could not
have been previously adjudicated.34s The court found a statu-
tory basis for the hospital's duty to maintain records,349 and rec-
ognized the tort of spoliation.350
civil conspiracy causes of action would permit adjudication at the same trial, bar-
ring subsequent collateral attack. Henry, 310 S.E. 2d at 336. Ripeness was also
not an issue, since the plaintiffs complaint on the civil conspiracy issue alleged an
injury independent from the loss of the underlying cause of action. Id.
341. 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (plaintiffs decedent husband's
death allegedly caused during negligent induction of anesthesia).
342. David R. Goodnight & Douglas R. Davis, Spoliation of Evidence: The Un-
necessary Tort, 25 J. HEALTH & Hosp. LAw 232, 232 (1992).
343. Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1309-10.
344. Id. at 1310.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1310-11 & n.2.
347. Id. at 1311.
348. Id. at 1311. Other jurisdictions have also held that a cause of action for
spoliation of evidence is not ripe until the underlying cause of action has been lost.
E.g., Fox v. Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that alleged breach
of statutory duty to maintain medical records had caused no injury and therefore
the cause of action was not ripe).
349. Id. at 1313 (citing FLA. STAT. § 395.202 (1979), repealed and replaced by
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.3025 (West 1993)).
350. Id.
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Similarly, after an unsuccessful state action for medical
malpractice, the plaintiff in Langager v. Lake Havasu Commu-
nity Hospital35 ' brought an action in federal district court alleg-
ing medical malpractice based on gross negligence in the
maintenance of her medical records. 352 Plaintiffs second count
alleged spoliation of evidence, resulting in the loss of the state
action. 353 Summary judgment was granted for the defendant on
both counts. 354 On appeal, it was affirmed that the malpractice
count was time barred.35 5 The court recognized that the alleged
spoliation damages arose from actions independent of the un-
derlying medical treatment, and that this cause of action was
governed by the two-year limitation period for injuries to the
person of another, rather than the three-year period for medical
malpractice. 356
Absent a duty to preserve evidence, the spoliation tort will
fail. In an unusual turnabout in Walsh v. Caidin,357 defendants
in a wrongful death action cross-complained against plaintiff
and her attorney for, inter alia, spoliation of evidence. 35 8 When
it became apparent that decedent was terminally ill, and know-
ing that a suit was contemplated in which the nature of the fa-
tal illness would be contested, defense counsel secured the
assent of plaintiff's counsel to the performance of an autopsy in
the event of death before the trial.35 9 However, decedent's
spouse had sole authority over the disposition of her husband's
remains and instead had the body cremated.36 0 The trial court
sustained plaintiffs demurrer to the cross-complaint.361 In af-
firming, the court of appeal found no need to extend its analysis
beyond the lack of duty on the part of decedent's spouse to pre-
351. 799 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986).
352. Id. at 1355.
353. Id. at 1355-56.
354. Id. at 1355.
355. Id. at 1356.
356. Id. at 1356-57.
357. 283 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Ct. App. 1991).
358. Id. at 327.
359. Id. at 327 & n.1.
360. Id. at 327.
361. Id.
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serve the body as "evidence" for defendant. 362 The court distin-
guished Walsh from the leading California case regarding the
independent tort of spoliation of evidence, Smith v. Superior
Court.3 6 3 However, if the defendant could prove that the plain-
tiff had been motivated by consciousness of weakness of her
case, the defendant could request that an adverse inference be
drawn from the act of cremation.364
The novelty of the independent tort of spoliation can act as
a disadvantage. In Threlkeld v. Haskins Law Firm365 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisi-
ana found no authority under Louisiana law to support a claim
for the independent tort of spoliation of evidence. 366 Since
plaintiff did not allege that the fetal monitor strips at issue
were destroyed through bad faith of the hospital the court
would not support even an adverse inference, citing the require-
ment of bad faith for this inference, rather than just mere
negligence. 367
A perceived lack of injury can also be fatal to the spoliation
tort. New York has declined to recognize the independent tort
of intentional spoliation of evidence, at least under the circum-
stances of Pharr v. Cortese.368 The court held that plaintiff had
not suffered actual damages, since the alleged spoliation had
not made prosecution of her case more expensive or difficult, 369
and that the spoliation inference, criminal and disciplinary
sanctions were available.370
362. Id. at 327-28 (noting that under CAL. HEALTH AND SAFEY CODE § 7100
(West 1970 & Supp. 1994), the surviving spouse had primary authority and right
to control decedent's remains).
363. Id. at 328 (citing Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App.
1984)); see supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
364. Id. at 329. Compare with Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 547-48 (W.D.
Okla. 1979) (once autopsy was undertaken by plaintiffs expert, a duty existed to
perform it in as non-destructive a manner as possible); see supra note 296 and
accompanying text.
365. Civ. A. No. 88-2392, 1991 WL 211520 (E.D. La. Sept. 27, 1991).
366. Id. at *1.
367. Id. (citing Vick v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.
1975)).
368. 147 Misc. 2d 1078, 559 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990); see
supra note 101 and accompanying text.
369. Id. at 781-82.
370. Id. at 782.
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D. Obstruction of Justice and Other Criminal Statutes;
Professional Sanctions
While no cases were found applying obstruction of justice or
other criminal statutes for spoliation of evidence in the medical
malpractice context, severe professional sanctions may accrue
for inappropriate alteration of medical records.371 In Jimenez
the court upheld the sanctions of a monetary fine, suspension of
license, and probation,372 in part because of the criminal nature
of alteration of medical records. 373 In Commission on Medical
Discipline v. McDonnell,374 a physician attempted to intimidate
two of plaintiff's expert witnesses at his malpractice trial.375
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held him to be guilty of
"immoral conduct of a physician in his practice as a physi-
cian."376 Such conduct was found to be "clearly morally wrong.
It amounts to an endeavor to obstruct justice .... That is a
crime involving moral turpitude,"377 and was considered to have
been committed as part of the physician's practice of
medicine. 378
E. Record Retention Statutes
Many states have statutes which specifically delineate a
duty to preserve medical records for a specified period of time,
whether litigation is pending or not.379 These statutes ensure
the availability of records to other health care providers and fa-
cilities, and ensure quality and continuity of care. 380 In Rodgers
371. Jimenez v. Department of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Medicine, 556
So. 2d 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (physician altered record after patient's
death).
372. Id. at 1220-21.
373. Id. at 1220 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0165 (West 1985), renumbered
as § 395.302 and amended in 1992).
374. 467 A.2d 1072 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983), rev'd, 483 A.2d 76 (Md. 1984).
375. Id. at 1075-77.
376. Id. at 1077 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 43 § 130(h)(8) (1980), recodified as
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ., § 14-504(3) (1981), renumbered as § 14-404(a)(3)
(1991)).
377. Id. at 1078.
378. Id. at 1079.
379. See supra note 126.
380. See Fox v. Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178, 182 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (citing the
American Hospital Association's Committee on Medical Records and the American
Medical Record Association's Planning and Bylaws Committee (Statement on
Preservation of Medical Records in Health Institutions, 1975)).
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v. St. Mary's Hospital,38 ' spoliation of evidence by one defendant
in the original malpractice claim, the hospital, gave rise to a
separate cause of action against the hospital when the spolia-
tion resulted in an unfavorable verdict against another defend-
ant, the radiologists. 3 2 Without appealing the verdict against
him in favor of the radiologists, plaintiff filed suit in Illinois Dis-
trict Court against the hospital, based upon the breach of the
hospital's statutory duty to retain X-rays or diagnostic quality
miniaturized versions for five years.38 3 Plaintiff claimed that
the X-rays were critical evidence in the malpractice suit against
a group of radiologists,384 the absence of which caused the loss
of his case against the radiologists.38 5
The circuit court acknowledged the existence of the tort of
spoliation of evidence. 38 6 It also conceded that res judicata re-
sulting from the summary judgment in favor of the hospital in
the malpractice action did not bar the spoliation action, and
held that the spoliation action is not controlled by the statute of
limitations governing medical malpractice. 38 7 Nonetheless, the
court held that Rodgers's failure to appeal the judgment in
favor of the radiologists barred his action for spoliation against
the hospital.388 The Illinois Court of Appeals held that it need
not decide whether Illinois recognized an independent tort for
spoliation of evidence, since Rodgers had stated a statutory
cause of action pursuant to the "X-Ray Retention Act".389 The
court held that since the statute protects the property rights of
those involved in litigation, violation of the statute constitutes
prima facie evidence of negligence. 390 The court found that Rod-
gers was an individual within the scope of protection of the stat-
ute, and thus that he had stated a proper cause of action.391
Rodgers's failure to appeal the judgment in favor of the
radiologists did not bar his spoliation claim, since the lost X-
381. 556 N.E.2d 913 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), affd, 597 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. 1992).
382. Id.
383. Id. at 915 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 157-11 (1987)).
384. Id. at 914-15.
385. Id. at 915.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 914-15.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 916 (citing ILL. RE v. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 157-11 (1987)).
390. Id.
391. Id.
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rays could not be recreated, and thus there was little chance of
success on appeal.3 92 The court also held that the spoliation
claim was not barred by res judicata because of the summary
judgment in favor of the hospital in the original malpractice
claim, since the evidence needed to show the hospital's violation
of the X-Ray Retention Act differed from the evidence needed to
show the hospital's negligence in the treatment of his wife.3 93
On further appeal, 394 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
Rodgers had a private cause of action under the X-Ray Reten-
tion Act.395 The court found that the X-Ray Retention Act is not
merely an administrative regulation to be enforced exclusively
by the Public Health Department; in fact, the Act provides no
administrative remedies which would compensate those injured
by violation of the Act.396 Also, the Illinois Supreme Court up-
held the appellate court's ruling that summary judgment in
favor of the hospital in the original malpractice action did not
act as a res judicata bar to the spoliation action, whether a
"same evidence" test or a transactional approach was used.39 7
One New York court, in Pharr v. Cortese,398 declined to rec-
ognize a private cause of action under a medical record reten-
tion statute.3 99 The court reasoned that the purpose of the
statute prohibiting alteration of medical records related solely
to the state's supervisory and disciplinary roles regarding the
practice of medicine, and did not create a private cause of ac-
392. Id. at 918-19.
393. Id. at 919.
394. Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp., 597 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. 1992).
395. Id. at 619. A private right of action exists under a statute when:
(1) plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the Act was enacted;
(2) it is consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act; (3) plaintiffs in-
jury is one the Act was designed to prevent; and (4) it is necessary to provide
an adequate remedy for violations of the Act.
Id. (citing Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1991)).
396. Id. at 619-20. Cf Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (statutory duty to preserve records formed the basis of duty for independent
tort of spoliation).
397. Rodgers, 597 N.E.2d at 621.
398. 147 Misc. 2d 1078, 559 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990).
399. Id. at 1081, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAw §§ 6506, 6509
(McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1994)).
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tion.400 The court found that other remedies, including criminal
sanctions, were available under New York law.401
Related to the statutes which require retention of medical
records are those which require disclosure of medical records. 40 2
In Davis v. Johns Hopkins Hospital4 3 the plaintiff brought a
malpractice action claiming that the defendant hospital had
failed to conform to the statutory requirement to disclose medi-
cal records.404 The trial court granted judgment to defendant on
this count.40 5 On appeal, the court interpreted "refuse" to mean
"intentional, as opposed to negligent or contractual conduct,"40 6
but noted that "no more than a mere refusal to disclose within a
reasonable time, upon proper request, whether done mali-
ciously or not, results in liability for punitive damages in addi-
tion to actual damages."40 7 The court found that whether
failure to disclose was intentional was a question for the jury.408
A physician-patient relationship must exist before refusal
to supply records would be actionable under a record disclosure
statute.40 9 In Saari, the defendant physician performed a phys-
ical examination of plaintiff on behalf of plaintiff's insurer.410
Based upon the examination, the insurer informed plaintiff that
it was discontinuing plaintiffs coverage. 41' The plaintiff then
sued for, inter alia, malpractice4 2 and "breach of doctor-patient
relationship" for the physician's refusal to release medical
records.413 The court held that no physician-patient relation-
400. Id.
401. Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAw § 215.40 (McKinney 1988)).
402. E.g., CAL. CrV. CODE § 56.10 (West 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.241
(West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., HFALTH-GEN. §§ 4-307 to 309 (1994); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.335 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
403. 585 A.2d 841 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
404. Id. at 842 (citing MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-302(d)(2) (1990) (re-
pealed and replaced by § 4-309 (1991))).
405. Id. at 843.
406. Id. at 850 (citing Laubach v. Franklin Square Hosp., 556 A.2d 682, 690
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989), affd, 569 A.2d 693 (Md. 1990)).
407. Id. at 851 (citing Laubach v. Franklin Square Hosp., 569 A.2d 693, 697
(Md. 1990)).
408. Id. at 851.
409. Saari v. Litman, 486 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
410. Id. at 814.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.; see MmN. STAT. ANN. § 144.335 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
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ship existed, and therefore no malpractice action could lie, nor
did a duty exist to furnish records.414
A less promising judicial response to failure to supply medi-
cal records was found in Roberts v. Golden.415 The court held
that summary judgment for defendant was properly granted on
plaintiffs complaint that defendant had withheld medical
records since plaintiff had not requested the records until the
underlying malpractice action was time barred.416 More signifi-
cantly, even if the alleged concealment had taken place while
the malpractice action was timely, the complaint still would
have been dismissed since it alleged only refusal to supply
records to be used in evaluating a tort claim of which plaintiff
was already aware,417 not concealment of a cause of action.418
E. Bailments
Only one case was found in which bailment was specifically
mentioned in the context of spoliation of evidence and medical
malpractice. 41 9 In Wolf plaintiff became aware of a metallic
fragment lodged in his knee upon which arthroscopy had been
performed at Lakewood Hospital twenty-seven months ear-
lier.420 Plaintiff had the metal fragment removed at Metropoli-
tan General Hospital. 421 Plaintiffs counsel attempted to
retrieve the metal fragment from Metropolitan, but was in-
formed that the pathology department had probably discarded
the specimen.422 Plaintiff sued Lakewood and her physician for
negligence, and Metropolitan for "prima facie tort."423 Metro-
414. Saari, 486 N.W.2d at 815.
415. 345 N.W.2d 924 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
416. Id. at 926-27.
417. Id. at 927 & n.2 (citing Tonegatto v. Budak, 316 N.W.2d 262 (Mich.
1982)).
418. Id. at 926-27. Cf Kelleher v. Mills, 245 N.W.2d 749 (Mich. Ct. App.
1976); Cates v. Bald Estate, 221 N.W.2d 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
419. Wolf v. Lakewood Hosp., 598 N.E.2d 160 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
420. Id. at 161.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. "Prima facie tort" was defined as, 'the infliction of intentional harm,
resulting in damage, without excuse or justification, by an act or series of acts
which would otherwise be lawful.'" Id. at 163 (citing Costell v. Toledo Hosp., 527
N.E.2d 858, 859 (Ohio 1988) (emphasis omitted)).
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politan's motion for judgment on the pleadings was
successful. 424
On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals rejected the bailment
theory, since Metropolitan had received no compensation for re-
taining the metal fragment, received no benefit as bailee, and
was, at most, a gratuitous bailee.425 The court held that
although the metal fragment was surgically removed at and re-
tained by Metropolitan, this was not the equivalent of the deliv-
ery required for a bailment to exist.426
IV. Analysis
A. The Availability and Effectiveness of the Various
Spoliation Remedies
All of the remedies discussed possess advantages and draw-
backs in terms of fulfilling the rationales of the spoliation reme-
dies: restoration of accuracy, compensation of the victim of
spoliation, and punishment of the spoliator.427
1. Spoliation Inference
Although the spoliation inference is a time-honored remedy
available in some form in all jurisdictions, it has several weak-
nesses as a remedy against acts of spoliation. One weakness is
the uncertainty of its application.428 It may exist as a literal
inference (the trier of fact may, but is not required to, draw the
inference) 429 or as a rebuttable presumption (the trier of fact
must accept the presumption, subject to rebuttal by the party
opposing the presumption).430 In either case, the inference may
be narrow, meaning that the missing evidence would have been
unfavorable to the spoliator,431 or broad, where the act of spolia-
424. Id. at 161-62.
425. Id. at 164.
426. Id. The court stated that the plaintiff alleging breach of a bailment con-
tract must establish "(1) the [existence of the] contract of bailment, (2) delivery of
the bailed property to the bailee, and (3) failure of the bailee to redeliver the prop-
erty at the termination of the bailment." Id. (citing David v. Lose, 218 N.E.2d 442,
444 (Ohio 1966)).
427. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
428. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 212-21 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 249-62 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
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tion is probative of the weakness of the spoliator's case as a
whole.432 The nature of the inference or presumption that the
spoliator must rebut may vary widely. The inference or pre-
sumption may simply be that the missing evidence would have
been unfavorable to the spoliator. 433 It may also be the degree
of fault with which the spoliation was committed,4 4 the appro-
priate standard of care,435 or the weakness of the case as a
whole.436 When a presumption is raised, only the burden of pro-
duction may be shifted, or the burden of persuasion may be
shifted as well.437
The degree of fault needed to raise the inference or pre-
sumption is also highly variable. While traditionally the spolia-
tion inference could be raised only for intentional behavior,438
various jurisdictions have both granted and denied inferences
and presumptions of various degrees for intentional, 439 reck-
less,440 and negligent spoliation, 441 as well as for loss of records
in violation of a statutory duty to preserve medical records. 442
Further, the logical basis of the spoliation inference would seem
not to support the inference for merely negligent conduct, since
negligent conduct should not presuppose a guilty mind or
knowledge of the weakness of one's case. 443 However, if the in-
ference is held inapplicable for negligent conduct, neither the
purpose of restoring accuracy nor compensating the victim of
432. Thor v. Boska, 113 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App. 1974); Meyer v. McDonnell,
392 A.2d 1129 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); see supra notes 235-48 and accompany-
ing text.
433. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 263-73 and accompanying text.
435. Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636, reh'g denied, 520 P.2d 361
(Or. 1974); see supra note 234.
436. See supra notes 235-48 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 271-82 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
439. See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
442. E.g., DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So. 2d 818 (Miss. 1992).
The concurrence's view of the scope of the spoliation inference gives a more accu-
rate view of the duty imposed upon a hospital to maintain medical records. While
not imposing strict liability, the statutes do not require intentional conduct for a
violation to be found. MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-9-63 (1972) and § 41-9-69 (Supp.
1990). See supra notes 274-82 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 209-210 and accompanying text.
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spoliation will be fulfilled.4" Facts can be just as irretrievable,
and the harm to the victim just as great, if records or other evi-
dence are negligently rather than intentionally made unavaila-
ble.445 The negligent absence of records can be just as great an
impediment to securing expert testimony as would be inten-
tional destruction. 446 Without expert testimony, few malprac-
tice claims will survive.447 Further, instances of self-serving
alterations of medical records may be found insufficient to raise
the inference at all.448
The requirement that litigation be pending or foreseeable
to give rise to the spoliation inference also poses difficulties. 449
While it would be impractical, if not impossible, to retain the
records of all patients, or every non-permanent record of any
given patient, routine record destruction programs have the po-
tential to foster inappropriate destruction of records. While
most record retention statutes require records to be preserved
for a period greatly in excess of the statute of limitations for a
medical malpractice action, 450 the adoption of the discovery rule
by many states could potentially leave a malpractice action via-
ble after the statutorily required record retention period has
ended.451 This is of special concern with regard to medications
which do not manifest a deleterious effect for many years.452
The destruction of pertinent records itself may make it impossi-
ble to demonstrate that litigation should have been foresee-
444. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
445. E.g., Battocchi v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 581 A-2d 759 (D.C. 1990).
While arguably merely negligent loss of records does not fully support the logic of
the spoliation inference, an exercise of the court's discretion to refuse to instruct
the jury regarding the missing evidence leaves the party unjustly deprived of evi-
dence uncompensated. Also, the decision fails to take into account the duty of a
hospital to preserve medical records. See supra notes 200-10 and accompanying
text.
446. See supra notes 249-58 and accompanying text.
447. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
448. See Furlong v. Stokes, 427 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1968); see supra notes 175-
80 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 61-63, 182 and accompanying text.
450. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
451. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
452. For example, adverse effects of diethylstilbestrol (DES), an agent used to
prevent miscarriage, may not manifest themselves until the offspring of a woman
exposed during pregnancy reaches adulthood herself. See Barbara Pober, Fetal
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) Effects, in BIRTH DEFECTS ENCYCLOPEDIA 694-95 (Mary
Louise Buyse ed., 1990).
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able.453 This would hinder the ability to even demonstrate that
failure to suspend a routine record destruction program was
unreasonable. 454
The spoliation inference cannot be raised against a non-
party who is not an agent of a party.455 This would leave the
victim of spoliation by a non-party hospital or staff member who
can not be shown to be an agent of the party without a remedy.
This requirement does not serve to restore accuracy. 456 The de-
terrence purpose is also poorly served, since this requirement
permits the possibility of undetected conspiracies to destroy
harmful records.457
Finally, if only an inference is raised, the jury is free to re-
ject it.458 The effect of the inference will likely be overshadowed
if plaintiff has been unable to secure adequate expert testimony
due to the absence of critical evidence. 459
2. Discovery Sanctions
Discovery sanctions are universally available and can pro-
vide a great deal of flexibility in fashioning remedies for spolia-
tion of evidence, both in terms of the variety of sanctions that
may be applied and the variety of bases of authority for impos-
ing such sanctions. 460 For example, even when an order compel-
ling discovery has not been issued, and even when a party has
not refused to participate in discovery to an extent prohibited in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d), 461 incomplete disclosure
may result in broad sanctions being applied when the rules re-
garding signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections
are violated.462 Courts have imposed discovery sanctions when
453. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
455. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
459. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
460. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
461. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d) provides for sanctions: "If a party ... fails (1) to
appear before the officer who is to take the deposition.., or (2) to serve answers or
objections to interrogatories ... or (3) to serve a written response to a request for
inspection. . . ." Id.
462. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(g)(2) provides:
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the spoliation inference would have been clearly inadequate. 463
Discovery sanctions give greater recognition to acts of spoliation
as evils in themselves that should be remedied. Damages due
to spoliation of evidence are caused not only by loss of the un-
derlying cause of action, but also by increased expense incurred
during discovery. 464
Negligent acts of spoliation are more amenable to remedia-
tion by discovery sanctions than by the spoliation inference.465
Severe sanctions may be imposed for conduct highly prejudicial
to the victim of spoliation even if the degree of fault is low. 466
Occasionally, however, courts have failed to impose sanctions if
the degree of fault is low, even if significant prejudice occurred,
thus weakening the compensatory effect of sanctions.467 Con-
versely, when mild or no sanctions may accrue if little or no
prejudice occurs, the deterrent effect is weakened.468
A weakness of the use of discovery sanctions as a remedy
for spoliation of evidence is that the trial court has a vast degree
of discretion in resolving matters concerning pretrial discov-
The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that to the
best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a rea-
sonable inquiry, the request, response or objection is: (A) consistent with
these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (B) not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (C) not unreasonable or un-
duly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery
already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation .... If without substantial-justification
a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certifi-
cation, the party on whose behalf the disclosure, request, response, or objec-
tion is made, or both, an appropriate sanction ....
Id.; Jerome v. Pardis, 783 P.2d 919 (Mont. 1989) (holding that although plaintiffs
incomplete disclosure of medical records after defendant's discovery request did
not violate a court order and did not constitute a complete failure to cooperate, the
court upheld the imposition of the sanction of dismissal with prejudice based upon
violation of the certification requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 26(g)).
463. Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545 (W.D. Okla. 1979); see supra notes 296-
99 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 73, 283 and accompanying text.
465. The spoliation inference addresses only willful acts of spoliation. See
supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
466. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
467. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 332-34 and accompanying text.
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ery.469 Even when a party's explanation for the unavailability
of evidence appears barely credible, courts may be hesitant to
disturb a trial court's findings regarding a pretrial discovery
motion unless the findings are against the substantial weight of
the evidence. 470
The problem of foreseeability of litigation, as discussed in
relation to the spoliation inference, also exists with discovery
sanctions, again because the very destruction of evidence makes
foreseeability of litigation problematic. 471 Discovery sanctions
will not solve the problem of the unavailability of expert wit-
nesses without crucial records. 472 Default judgments could pro-
vide a remedy, but these have rarely been employed for
spoliation in the medical malpractice context. 473 Further, dis-
covery sanctions cannot be applied against non-agent third
party spoliators.474
3. Independent Tort of Spoliation
The independent tort of spoliation of evidence clearly recog-
nizes the independent harm caused by the destruction of evi-
469. E.g., Bradley v. United States, 866 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1989). A more
favorable outcome would have accrued to plaintiff had the court of appeals simply
excluded the testimony of the experts. However, this was not believed to be possi-
ble, since the findings of fact of the district court not only referred to the experts'
testimony, but also interpreted other testimony in light of it. The court of appeals
could have instructed the district court to exclude the testimony of the govern-
ment's experts at the new trial. While no reason is given explicitly for not taking
this course, this decision may have been based on the absence of any real "destruc-
tion" of evidence which could not be recreated, and the reasoning that sanctions
were punishment enough without depriving the Government of its only testimony
which could effectively dispute plaintiffs evidence regarding proximate cause. Id.
at 127. See supra notes 285-95 and accompanying text.
470. E.g., Brown v. Hamid, No. WD 44461, 1992 WL 42300 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar.
10, 1992). The appellate court refused to upset trial court's refusal to grant plain-
tiffs motion for a default judgment based upon defendant physician's failure to
supply medical records. Id. at *3. Defendant claimed to have sent records, with-
out keeping a copy, to plaintiffs attorney, who claimed not to have received them.
Id. at *2. Defendant testified at deposition that he never personally handled such
requests, delegating this duty to his office staff. Id. Plaintiff proffered evidence
that members of defendant's staff would testify that defendant always insisted on
handling such matters personally. Id.
471. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
472. See supra note 446 and accompanying text.
473. See supra notes 283-335 and accompanying text.
474. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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dence. 475 The tort may apply to both negligent and intentional
conduct, although only the latter may solve the problem of pro-
viding a remedy against the third party spoliator.476
Some commentators have argued that independent torts for
spoliation of evidence are unnecessary and undesirable. 477 Sev-
eral objections have been raised. One is that a spoliation claim
can never be a truly independent one since it depends upon the
underlying cause of action for its very existence. 478 The specter
is raised that claims for spoliation of evidence may themselves
give rise to claims for spoliation of evidence (although admit-
tedly, this has not yet been known to occur).479 This argument
is unpersuasive. To hold that one cause of action should never
give rise to another would be to abnegate the existence of a
charge of perjury or obstruction of justice arising from an un-
derlying criminal prosecution, or the existence of a cause of ac-
tion for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. 480 Further,
the spoliation tort need not always be pursued as separate liti-
gation, but may be pursued in the same litigation by amending
the complaint.48 '
Acts of spoliation of evidence arise out of different conduct
than that giving rise to the underlying act of malpractice.4 2
The malpractice cause of action arises from acts failing to meet
the standard of care with regard to diagnosis or treatment
which proximately cause injury to the patient's health, bodily or
mental functioning, longevity, or capacity to earn.483 On the
other hand, the spoliation cause of action arises from independ-
ent acts, directly or indirectly related to foreseeable or pending
litigation for medical malpractice, intentionally or negligently,
resulting in loss, destruction, alteration, or unavailability of evi-
dence, in violation of the duty to preserve such evidence, which
proximately cause injury to the plaintiffs cause of action.4M
475. See supra notes 92, 339 and accompanying text.
476. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
477. Goodnight & Davis, supra note 342, at 232.
478. Id. at 235.
479. Id.
480. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
481. Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986); Smith
v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984).
482. See supra notes 351-56 and accompanying text.
483. See supra notes 356, 393 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
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The duties, standards of care, acts, and interests that are in-
jured in the malpractice action and the spoliation action differ.
Ironically, it was because acts of malpractice and spoliation
arose out of different conduct that a plaintiffs attempt to
amend her original complaint to allege failure to maintain med-
ical records was denied.48 5
It is also argued that deciding whether and how the de-
stroyed evidence would have contributed to the victim's case is
speculative. 48 6 However, this speculativeness also plagues the
spoliation inference and discovery sanctions as well, where it is
necessary to show that the destroyed evidence was relevant.487
In each instance, a determination of the damage to the underly-
ing cause of action or relevance becomes problematic because
the contents of the evidence remain unknown due to the very
destruction of the evidence itself.488 Decrying the speculative-
ness of the tort accrues to the benefit of the allegedly guilty spo-
liator and to the detriment of the innocent victim.
Another concern raised is that of ripeness.489 Some courts
that have recognized the independent tort have held that the
underlying cause of action first must be lost before the tort of
spoliation may lie,490 while others have not.491 It has been ar-
485. Brown v. Hamid, No. WD 44461, 1992 WL 42300 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 10,
1992) (remanded on other grounds). The alleged mishandling of records was held
not to relate back to the original date of filing since it did not involve medical
treatment, and was thus barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at *3. Interest-
ingly, the statute of limitations applied was that relating to health care. Id. Sec-
tion 516.105 of Missouri's Annotated Statutes provides: "[a]ll actions against
physicians.., for damages for malpractice, negligence, error or mistake related to
health care shall be brought within two years from the date of occurrence of the act
complained of." Mo. ANN STAT. § 516.105 (Vernon Supp. 1993). Since the court
held that the mishandling of medical records did not involve medical treatment,
arguably it also did not involve health care. Brown, 1992 WL 42300 at *3. In that
case, a cause of action for spoliation, had it been recognized as an independent tort,
could have been held to have accrued at the time injury occurred to the plaintiffs
malpractice cause of action. See also Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984); see supra notes 341-50 and accompanying text.
486. Goodnight & Davis, supra note 342, at 235-36.
487. See supra notes 58-63, 79 and accompanying text.
488. See County of Solano v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721 (Ct. App. 1989) stat-
ing that "[T]here will be doubt about what the evidence would have shown." Id. at
730.
489. Goodnight & Davis, supra note 342, at 236.
490. Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Pe-
trik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Fox v.
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gued that the reasoning of those courts which require loss of the
underlying cause of action as actual demonstrated harm is
analogous to the case and controversy (ripeness) requirement of
Article III of the federal constitution. 492 However, some courts
have correctly noted that the increased inconvenience and ex-
pense of proving the underlying cause of action are compensable
harms even without demonstrating loss of the underlying
claim.493 Also, damage to the underlying suit by spoliation par-
allels the loss of the benefit of the bargain in the contract con-
text, and loss of a chance of recovery in the medical malpractice
context.
Uncertainty of damages is also stated as an objection to the
spoliation tort.494 However, uncertainty of damages does not
generally act as a bar to awarding damages, nor should it act as
a bar to recognition of a tort.495 A degree of uncertainty exists
in the award of damages for pain and suffering, future medical
expenses, and lost future earnings in tort, and lost expectancy
in contract. It is the spoliator who occasions the uncertainty;
therefore, it would be unjust for the victim to suffer.
The traditional remedies of the spoliation inference and
discovery sanctions may not always adequately compensate the
victim or punish the spoliator. Since the spoliation inference
merely permits, but does not require, the trier of fact to find
that the destroyed evidence would be unfavorable to the spolia-
tor,496 its remedial effect is uncertain, especially when the trier
of fact is a jury. The weight afforded to the spoliation inference,
even if accepted by the jury, is also unclear. Further, since the
content of the evidence must remain unknown due to the very
act of spoliation, whether the lost evidence would have allowed
Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Federated Mut. Ins. v. Litchfield Preci-
sion Components, 456 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Minn. 1990).
491. Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 459 (Alaska 1986);
Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835 (Ct. App. 1984).
492. Goodnight & Davis, supra note 342, at 236.
493. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
494. E.g., Pharr v. Cortese, 147 Misc. 2d 1078, 559 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1990). Had the court recognized that harm to plaintiffs malpractice
cause of action represented an independent cause of action, it might have held that
the question of damages represented a matter of fact to be decided by the jury. See
Goodnight and Davis, supra note 342, at 236-37.
495. See Solano, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31.
496. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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the victim to meet the burden of persuasion on an essential ele-
ment of medical practice will also remain unknown.497 When
the spoliation tort is brought, the plaintiff must show injury to
the underlying medical malpractice action, not that he would
have necessarily prevailed. 498
Even when the spoliation "inference" is actually a rebutta-
ble presumption requiring the trier of fact to find that the lost
evidence would have been unfavorable to the spoliator, it is
problematic whether the inference outweighs the damage done
to the expert witness's testimony by the inability to examine
crucial records. 499 When the cause of action is for the tort of
spoliation rather than medical malpractice, the need for and im-
portance of the expert medical witness is decreased or
eliminated. 500
Some difficulties in the application of the spoliation tort do
exist. It is currently not widely available.50 1 There is no uni-
formity in the recognition of negligent as opposed to intentional
spoliation.50 2 There is also little agreement as to whether the
underlying cause of action must be lost before damages will be
recognized to have occurred, or for the spoliation cause of action
to have "ripened".50 3 Most likely, the plaintiff pleading a spolia-
tion cause of action will need to carry the burden of production
concerning all elements as opposed to the shifting of the burden
to the defendant that occurs when the spoliation inference is
497. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
498. See supra notes 351-56 and accompanying text.
499. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
500. See supra notes 349-50, 356 and accompanying text.
501. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
503. Fox v. Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178, 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that if the
underlying malpractice action is still pending the plaintiff has not yet sustained
any damages); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc.,
456 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Minn. 1990) (holding that the underlying claim must be re-
solved "to demonstrate actual harm and prevent speculative recovery in spoliation
action"). Cf Pharr v. Cortese, 147 Misc. 2d 1078, 1080-81, 559 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781-
82 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990) (holding that the alleged alteration of medical
records would not allow plaintiff to amend complaint to include spoliation of evi-
dence, since the alleged spoliation had not made her case more difficult to prose-
cute). The court may have also considered the spoliation tort to be premature since
the underlying cause of action was still pending, but did not comment upon
whether an independent cause of action for spoliation would lie if the malpractice
action had been defeated. See supra notes 368-70 and accompanying text.
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employed. 5°4 Also, the applicable statute of limitations, when
recognized, may be shorter than that for the underlying mal-
practice claim.50 5 Whether this factor will be significant may
depend upon whether the spoliation cause of action is held to
accrue before litigation commences.
4. Obstruction of Justice Statutes
As a practical matter, no case has been found where ob-
struction of justice statutes have been applied to remedy spolia-
tion of evidence in a medical malpractice claim. In some
jurisdictions, these statutes do not apply to civil actions. 50 6
Since these statutes are criminal in nature, they will be strictly
construed, and will not provide a private right of action to the
spoliation victim. 50 7 Further, if the offense is a misdemeanor,
the potential spoliator may not be deterred from destroying po-
tentially devastating evidence.508 While professional sanctions
may have a higher deterrent value, even this remedy does not
compensate the victim or restore accuracy to judicial
proceedings.
5. Record Retention Statutes
Most jurisdictions have medical record retention stat-
utes.50 9 As a remedy for spoliation, these statutes recognize the
independence of failure to preserve records from the underlying
medical malpractice claim.510 This approach decreases the spo-
liation victim's burden by allowing him to show simply that
records were not retained, independent of degree of fault.51'
Since violation of the statute is negligence per se, a cause of
action based upon such a statute borders upon strict liability in
tort.51 2 Further, the statutes provide a clear source of the duty
to maintain records for jurisdictions which choose to use them
504. See supra notes 45-47, 107-14 and accompanying text.
505. See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
506. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
507. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
508. See Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
509. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
510. See supra notes 394-97 and accompanying text.
511. See supra notes 389-90 and accompanying text.
512. See infra notes 518-19 and accompanying text.
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as the basis of a duty in the spoliation tort. The statute applies
to health care facilities that are not parties to the suit.513
The application of this remedy is illustrated in Rodgers v.
St. Mary's Hospital.51 4 It is noteworthy that in Rodgers, spolia-
tion committed by one codefendant below, the hospital, in a
malpractice action defeated the cause of action against another
codefendant below, the radiologists. 515 Invoking the spoliation
inference against the spoliator, the hospital, would not have
aided the plaintiff since the factual basis for a claim against the
hospital differed from that against the radiologists.51 6 The hos-
pital could not be deemed the agent of the radiologists concern-
ing the lost X-rays, since such loss was not accomplished at the
radiologists' request. 517 Thus, allowing a separate statutory
cause of action provided relief that the inference could not.
Permitting a statutory cause of action for spoliation also re-
sulted in a lighter evidentiary burden for the plaintiff; Rodgers
needed to show only that the statute had been violated to estab-
lish a rebuttable presumption of negligence. 518 This would shift
the burden of production to the defendant to show that the al-
leged violation of the statute was either reasonable or not a
proximate cause of the injury.519 Had the cause of action for
spoliation proceeded as an independent tort, the plaintiff would
have carried the burden of production of all elements of negli-
gence. 520 It is also uncertain whether the court would have rec-
ognized an independent cause of action for spoliation in the
absence of an applicable statute.52' Interestingly, the court did
not decide the issue of strict liability for spoliation of evidence in
violation of a statute.
513. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
514. 556 N.E.2d 913 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), affd, 597 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. 1992).
515. Id. at 916-17.
516. Id. at 919. Apparently, Rodgers had proceeded against the hospital on a
respondeat superior theory. Id. The action against the radiologists claimed failure
to diagnose his wife's medical condition. Id. at 915.
517. Id.
518. Id. at 916.
519. Id.
520. See supra note 504 and accompanying text.
521. Rodgers, 556 N.E.2d at 915-16. The Illinois Appellate Court had previ-
ously declined to decide this issue. Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d
1312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Fox v. Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
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When the duty to disclose medical records is construed as
addressing only intentional failure to disclose, negligent nondis-
closure (honestly stating that records are unavailable in the
mistaken belief that they are lost when in fact they have not
been lost) will not be actionable.5 22 This approach, whereby re-
fusal to disclose medical records is actionable only when there is
intent to conceal the existence of a cause of action, provides no
remedy when the refusal hinders the successful prosecution of a
known cause of action, and would not serve the truth-seeking or
fairness policies which justify controlling spoliation. Possibly,
such circumstances could be approached by use of record reten-
tion statutes if the reason for nondisclosure is loss or destruc-
tion of the records.
Although record retention statutes are widely available,
their application to the spoliation of evidence has been rare. It
is unclear whether jurisdictions other than Illinois will recog-
nize a private right of action under record retention statutes.
These statutes generally do not apply to third party spoliators
other than the responsible health care facility.
B. Analogy of Spoliation to the Law of Bailments
Although medical records are maintained as the property of
the health care provider, they contain much information of
value to the patient, even aside from their potential utility in a
legal action, that constitutes a property right in the patient.
The health care provider is in rightful possession of this prop-
erty right.5 23 It files and maintains such records, and exercises
dominion over them.524 Contrary to the analysis provided in
Wolf v. Lakewood Hospital,525 delivery is not an essential ele-
ment of a bailment.5 26 The essential element of a bailment is
522. Davis. v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 622 A.2d 128, 138-39 (Md. 1993); see
supra notes 403-08 and accompanying text.
523. While the health care provider has been construed as the owner of the
record itself, patients do have a right to the information contained in them. AMA
Code of Ethics, supra note 133, at 58 (citing South Carolina Att'y Gen. Op. (Feb. 19,
1978) available on LEXIS, States Library, S.C. File).
524. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
525. 598 N.E.2d 160 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
526. BROWN, supra note 135, §§ 10.2-.3. The situation in which the subject
matter of a bailment, medical records, is already in the possession of the bailee, the
health care provider, is analogous to the situation in which the subject matter of a
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possession, physical control with the intent to exercise that con-
trol.527 The health care provider exercises such control and is
the bailee of the property rights to the patient's records.
The maintenance of medical records, X-rays, surgical speci-
mens, removed foreign bodies, and other medical evidence
serves both the patient (bailor) and health care facility (bailee),
and is analogous to a bailment for mutual benefit. 528 The pa-
tient is benefitted, since an accurate record of diagnosis, treat-
ment, and follow-up care is available to current and future
health care providers, insurers, government agencies, schools,
and others with a legitimate interest in the patient's medical
status.529 The maintenance of records likewise benefits the
health care provider in pursuing its business.
Ordinarily, a bailment for mutual benefit would impose no
more than an ordinary duty of care upon the bailee.5 30 How-
ever, like the warehouseman and common carrier, the hospital
or other health care provider holds itself out as one who can
safeguard the patients' property interest in their medical
records.531 Further, the patient does not stand on equal footing
with the health care facility in terms of access to medical
records, especially in terms of securing evidence that records
were negligently lost or altered.532 The possibility of collusion
between the health care facility and the practitioner who is sub-
ject to a malpractice suit is a real one.533 Public policy, in the
form of record retention statutes, indicates the need for a higher
than usual standard of care on the part of the health care pro-
vider as bailee of medical records. For these reasons, the bailee
of medical records and specimens should be held to a greater
than ordinary standard of care; like the common carrier, the
health care provider should be held to be a virtual insurer of
medical records.
gift is already in the possession of the donee. In the latter case, formal delivery is
not required. Id. § 7.8.
527. Id. §§ 10.2-.3.
528. See id. § 11.2.
529. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
530. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
531. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
532. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
533. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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The bailment created between the patient and the health
care provider is not a mere gratuitous bailment, contrary to the
holding in Wolf.534 An implied contract exists between the pa-
tient and the health care facility to properly maintain records.
Proper maintenance of records is part of what patients have a
right to expect when they pay for health care, in part due to the
general duty to provide appropriate health care and in part due
to the statutory duty to maintain records. It is also part of what
the health care facility expects to provide.535 Proper mainte-
nance of health records is clearly within the contemplation of
the parties.
If the bailee of medical records is held to the standard of the
common carrier, he will be held to be a virtual insurer of the
records, and subject to strict liability in tort.536 Once the victim
of spoliation, the bailor, has made a prima facie case that a bail-
ment existed and that the records were not delivered, a rebutta-
ble presumption will arise against the bailee, shifting the
burden of production to the bailee in some jurisdictions, and the
burden of persuasion in others.537 Even if the bailee is held to
only an ordinary standard of care, if the bailment arose from an
express or implied contract the presumption of negligence
arises against the bailee, shifting the burden of production to
him in some jurisdictions, and the burden of persuasion in
others. 538
Applying a bailment approach to spoliation of evidence in
medical malpractice cases would avoid a number of the
problems posed by the application of other spoliation remedies.
The spoliation inference suffers from many uncertainties. It is
unclear whether the spoliation "inference" is a true inference or
a presumption.539 Jurisdictions vary as to whether negligent or
only intentional acts of spoliation should give rise to the infer-
ence. 540 It is uncertain whether the inference will point to the
534. 598 N.E.2d 160, 164; see supra notes 419-25 and accompanying text.
535. A number of professional health care organizations have set standards
for the maintenance of medical records. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying
text.
536. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
537. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
538. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
539. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 438-42 and accompanying text.
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weakness of the spoliator's case as a whole, or only to the un-
favorability of the missing evidence to the spoliator.541 Courts
vary as to whether or not litigation must be pending before the
inference may be invoked. 542 The inference is not available
against a collusive, non-party spoliator.543 Finally, if the "infer-
ence" is truly an inference, the jury is free to reject it.544
Applying a bailment approach to the spoliation of evidence
simplifies matters considerably; it will create a true presump-
tion against the spoliating bailee, and will shift either the bur-
den of production or persuasion depending upon the standard of
care to which a bailee of medical records is held. A bailment
approach applies equally well to party and non-party spoliators
alike, so long as the non-party spoliator is a health care facility
with a contractual or statutory duty to maintain medical
records, or is an agent of the bailee.
The use of discovery sanctions as a remedy for spoliation
also suffers from variable application, questionable foreseeabil-
ity of litigation in the face of unavailability of crucial evidence,
and inapplicability to third parties.545 These obstacles are
avoided by a bailment approach.
Although, as discussed above, an independent tort of spoli-
ation of evidence is preferable to either the spoliation inference
or discovery sanctions alone, problems of availability of the tort,
whether it applies to negligent as well as intentional spoliation,
and ripeness are remaining concerns. 546 A cause of action for
breach of bailment is a time-honored cause of action of univer-
sal availability. The degree of fault to be applied would range
from ordinary negligence (when the bailment is construed to be
for mutual benefit) to no negligence at all (if the health care
provider is considered the equivalent of a common carrier or
found to have a statutory duty to preserve records).547 Ripeness
would not be an issue, since a breach of bailment, founded
either on an implied contract or a statutory basis, will exist re-
gardless of whether the underlying cause of action is still pend-
541. See supra notes 431-32 and accompanying text.
542. See supra note 449 and accompanying text.
543. See supra note 455 and accompanying text.
544. See supra note 458 and accompanying text.
545. See supra notes 471-74 and accompanying text.
546. See supra notes 501-05 and accompanying text.
547. See supra notes 138, 148-49, 512 and accompanying text.
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ing. The tort may have the advantage of providing a remedy
against the non-party spoliator who does not have the duties of
a bailee or who is not an agent of the bailee.
An action in bailment avoids the problem of strict construc-
tion of criminal obstruction of justice and witness tampering
statutes, and is universally available in civil matters. 548 The
deterrent value of available damages will arguably be higher
than criminal statutes that are punishable as a misdemeanor.
Record retention statutes are one of the bases of the bailee's
duty to maintain medical records in a bailment approach to spo-
liation.549 Application of such statutes in the case of loss of
medical records may have an advantage over the bailment ap-
proach since, at least as interpreted in Rodgers v. St. Mary's
Hospital,550 violation of such a statute is prima facie evidence of
negligence, 551 and may be governed by the principles of strict
liability.552 However, it is uncertain whether courts outside Illi-
nois will apply such statutes in the spoliation context, and if
other jurisdictions will find that such statutes permit a private
cause of action.5 53
The bailment approach may do little to restore the accuracy
diminished by the act of spoliation. However, if evidence is de-
stroyed or otherwise rendered permanently unavailable, no spo-
liation remedy will restore the missing evidence. Even when
the spoliation inference is properly applied, it does not restore
the missing facts, but merely tips the balance back against the
spoliator. If evidence is not permanently unavailable but is
merely withheld, an order to compel production can be issued
along with a bailment approach.
The bailment approach appears to be the most certain way
to compensate the victim and punish the spoliator. Since the
bailment relation is contractually based, consequential dam-
548. See supra notes 506-07 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
550. 556 N.E.2d 913 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), affd, 597 N.E. 2d 616 (Ill. 1992); see
supra notes 379-93 and accompanying text.
551. Rodgers, 556 N.E.2d at 916; see supra notes 518-19 and accompanying
text.
552. See Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp., 597 N.E.2d 616, 620 (Ill. 1992). How-
ever, the issue of whether strict liability should govern a violation of the statute
was not reached since it had not been raised on appeal. Id.
553. See supra notes 398-408 and accompanying text.
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ages, as long as they are foreseeable, can be awarded. The un-
certainty of the amount of damages if the underlying cause of
action is still pending presents no more difficulty than any
other situation in which the amount of damages is not known
with precision.5 54 In any event, breach of a bailment is an in-
dependent wrong.
V. Conclusion
The courts should strive to strictly discourage spoliation of
evidence in the medical malpractice context, no matter what
form it may take. The health care facility exercises a great de-
gree of control over medical records and other forms of medical
evidence, and stands in a vastly superior position to the patient
and potential plaintiff regarding the disposition of such evi-
dence. None of the spoliation remedies applied individually will
uniformly provide an ideal solution to the problem of spoliation.
However, a bailment approach appears to be the simplest and
most uniform remedy for the spoliation of evidence in the medi-
cal malpractice context. It will best serve the purposes of spoli-
ation remedies which compensate the victim and punish the
spoliator. The bailment approach should be considered, and
hopefully recognized, as a tool to be employed in conjunction
with other available remedies whenever the courts are faced
with the problem of spoliation of evidence in the medical mal-
practice context.
Anthony C. Casamassima, M.D.t
554. See supra note 495 and accompanying text.
t The author dedicates this article to his wife, Teresa Lynn Casamassima,
and daughters Nicole, Samantha, and Danielle Casamassima, who endured many
lonely hours during its preparation, and to the memory of his parents, Louis and
Frances Casamassima.
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